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Contemporary regional growth theories tend to 
emphasize that the economic growth of a single region 
is usually traced to some natural and immobile resour­
ce for which an external demand exists. Some of these 
theories are concerned with supply markets and some 
with demand markets. There is another school of 
regional growth theories, which emphasize that invest­
ments to exploit natural resources are attracted to 
these resources and lead to the further expansion of 
productive activity in the region through the stimu­
lation of local demand and the creation of substantial 
external economies. The latter school of regional 
growth theories assumes that the region’s growth is in 
the long run made to depend on the extent of its par­
ticipation in the rapidly expanding sectors of the total 
economy. The argument claims that the region’s par­
ticipation in the national growth also depends on the 
economies of location that are created there.
The theories concerned with natural and immobile 
resources as Well as with the optimum location of the 
firm in an impersonal space are called «classical lo­
cation theories» and they emphasize regional equilib­
rium. They have been formulated by people like von 
Thiinen, Weber, Ohlin, Lösch, Alonso and others.1
Other theories formulated in terms of a general 
equilibrium model focus on the structural character­
istics of a system of point locations and explain at 
the same time the patterns of these point locations at 
two separate periods of time. They are called «spatial 
organization theories.»2
There have been further elaborate attempts to deal 
with the dynamics of a system of point locations or 
regions, where interregional flows of labour and cap­
ital are looked upon as the principal mechanisms for 
reestablishing a balance that might have been dis­
turbed. The theories concerned with the interregional
1. Cf. von Thiinen, Johan Heinrich, 1895. Der Isolierte 
Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirtschaft und Nationalökonomie. 
Berlin. Weber, Alfred, 1929. Alfred Weber's Theory of the 
Location of Industries. Translated by C. J. Friedrich, Chicago 
U. P., 1929. Lösch, A. The Economics of Location, New 
Haven, 1954, Yale University Press. John P. Friedmann and 
William Alonso (eds.), Regional Development and Planning: A 
Reader, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964. Bertil Ohlin, 
Interregional and International Trade, Harvard Economic 
Studies, 39, Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1933.
2. Some major theoretical statements are: Walter Isard, 
1956, Location and Space Economy, Cambridge, Mass., The 
MIT Press. Also cf. Edwin von Böventer, «Spatial Organization 
Theory as A Basis for Regional Planning,»Journal of the Amer­
ican Institute of Planners, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (May 1964), pp. 
90-99, and Brian J. L. Berry, Geography of Market Centers 
and Retail Distribution, Foundations of Economic Geogra­
phy Series, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1967. See 
also John Friedmann, «A Theory of Polarized Development,» 
pp. 41-42, in Urbanization, Planning and National Develop­
ment, SAGE Publications, Beverly Hills, London, 1973.
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flows of labour and capital consider the compensatory 
flows of factor movements from «surplus» to «defi­
cit» regions and they tend once more to revert to a 
general equilibrium model. They have been formu­
lated by people like Richardson, who derived his 
theory from Harrod-Domar growth theory models, 
and Mrs. Lutz.1
Finally, the theories concerned with industrial 
complex analysis and «growth centers» have been 
formulated by people like Perroux, Hirschman and 
others, and they emphasize regional disequilibrium.2
None of these theories though explain regional 
growth as a function of changes in the economic and 
social structure of societies, nor do they emphasize 
the institutional and organizational framework of 
society and specifically the patterns of authority and 
dependency that result from the unusual capacity of 
certain areas to generate innovation and growth. Theo­
ries of polarized development are recent offshoots of 
theories of regional growth and tend to formulate 
their theory and hypothesis on the relations existing 
between core and periphery regions and have been 
formulated by people like John Friedmann, André 
Gunter Frank and Gunnar Myrdal.3
It is the purpose of this paper to present the theory 
of polarized development explaining the polarization 
effect mainly as a function of changes in the structures 
that inevitably limit a region’s capacity for expansion; 
second as a function of the region’s capacity for the 
continuous generation and absorption of innovations, 
and finally as a function of the institutional and organ­
izational framework of society. The main argument 
will be that the dominant core and the dominated peri­
phery together constitute a relatively stable spatial 
system in which the periphery is «colonized» by the 
core region in order to sustain the continued growth 
of the latter. «Space» is used here in the non-physical 
sense of a field of forces. It will mean energy levels,
1. Cf. H. M. Richardson, «Regional Growth» in Regional 
Economics, World University, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Lon­
don, 1969 and Vera Lutz, Italy: A Study in Economic Develop­
ment, 1962.
2. Cf. François Perroux, (1) «La notion de pôle de croissan­
ce», dans FEconomie Appliquée, Nos. 1-2, 1955; (2) «Les points 
de développement et les foyers de progrès», Cahiers de VISE A, 
No. 94, novembre 1959; (3) «La firme motrice dans une région 
et la région motrice», dans VEconomie du XXe Siècle, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1961. Albert Hirschman, «Investment 
Policies,» in The American Economie Review, September 1957, 
and The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven, 
Conn., 1958.
3. Cf. John Friedmann, Urbanization, Planning and National 
Development, «A Theory of Polarized Developmen» in op. cit. 
André Gunter Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in 
Latin America, Penguin Books, 1969 as well as Latin America:
Underdevelopment or Revolution, Monthly Review Press, 1969. 
Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Re­
gions, Methuen and Co., Ltd., London, U. P., 1972 and An 
American Dilemma, 1944.
decision-making power, communication, flow of peo­
ple, etc. An attempt will be made to establish a lin­
kage between social change and spatial organization.
It is only through an historical, social, political and 
economic analysis that this perceived polarization can 
be explained and understood.
The problems of resources, stimulation of local 
demand, economies of location and the process of 
creation of external and scale economies will also be 
treated but they will be considered to be complemen­
tary and originating mainly from structural sociopo­
litical imbalances found in the national system.
It will be argued that classical regional growth theo­
ries are more applicable to advanced and integrated 
spatial systems like the ones existing in the United 
States, Western Germany and Sweden and that they 
offer little insight to the analysis of regional structures 
existing in the industrialising countries, like Greece, 
the Middle East and the Third World countries, where 
core-periphery relations are still predominant in­
fluences.
The case of Greece will be analyzed as an example 
of highly polarized regional development, which has 
its sources not on natural resources and other eco­
nomic or ecological considerations but rather on 
institutional ones.
The general theory of polarized development sug­
gested and formulated by Friedmann will be here pre­
sented in an attempt to explain and analyze the intense 
regional dualism existing in industrializing countries 
with special reference to Greece.
theoretical background
The General Theory of Polarized Development
Friedmann moved from a purely economic argu­
ment of regional development theory toward a linkage 
between regional interaction theory and the theory of 
social change. For the theory of social change Fried­
mann relied on a modification of Ralf Dahrendorf’s 
analysis of change through conflict in an authority- 
dependency situation.4
Friedmann treats development as taking place 
through constant innovative forces arising from or 
injected into an existing «traditional» system. Inno­
vation is interpreted by Friedmann to be the successful 
introduction of new ideas, articrafts or combinations 
and requires an innovating agent, that is—in the 
Schumpeterian sense—an enterpreneur.
4. For a detailed presentation of the theory, see John Fried­
mann, «A Theory of Polarized Development» in op. cit. Cf. 
also Harold Brookfield’s, «Notions of Inequality, Space and 
Polarized Growth» in Interdependent Development, Methuen 
and Co., Ltd., 1975.
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As it was demonstrated above, Friedmann used 
Dahrendorf’s conflict model of social change, in which 
the principal variable is the pattern of authority-de­
pendency relationships that characterizes any organ­
ized system, and on which he developed and founded 
his general theory of polarized development.
As spatial systems are territorially organized sys­
tems of social relations, Dahrendorf’s conflict model 
constitutes a promising start for formulating a general 
theory of polarized socio-economic spatial develop­
ment. The general theory of polarized development 
states:
1. Development is characterized as an innovative 
process leading to the structural transformation of 
social systems and consequently of the spatial ones. 
The innovative process may be technical or institu­
tional (social, economic, political and cultural); the 
cumulative effect of these innovations transforms the 
established structure of society by attracting creative 
or innovative personalities into the enclaves of accel­
erated change and by encouraging the formation of 
new values, attitudes and behaviour traits consistent 
with the innovation.
2. Friedmann maintains that there are certain 
conditions favourable to innovation and these con­
ditions are usually present in large and rapidly grow­
ing urban systems, or at the points of highest potential 
interaction in a «communication field,» which is again 
to be found in large urban systems. Some of these 
conditions are the pressure of unprecedented prob­
lems resulting from rapid growth, high densities as 
well as the presence of culturally heterogeneous popu­
lation groups in large cities. All the above pressures 
generate urgent demands which traditional mental 
attitudes and institutions cannot adequately solve.
3. He further claims that innovation is linked to 
the concepts of power and authority in territorially 
organized socioeconomic spatial systems. The conflict 
that may result from the efforts of innovating agents 
to legitimate their power is involving a wider conflict 
over the legitimacy of some or all authority-dependen­
cy relations within a spatial system. This conflict can 
have four possible outcomes: suppression, neutrali­
zation, cooption and replacement. Having once gained 
access to positions of authority, former counter-elites 
may either foreclose further innovative efforts or 
create a social environment capable of absorbing suc­
cessive innovating groups into an adaptive system of 
authority-dependency relations.
4. He continues by saying that development, view­
ed as occurring through a discontinuous but cumula­
tive process of innovation, will tend to have its origin 
in a relatively small number of centers of change lo­
cated at the points of highest potential interaction 
Within a communication field. Innovations will tend 
to spread downward and outward from these centers
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to areas where the probability of potential interaction 
is lower.
Following Friedmann’s analysis, major centers of 
innovative change will be called core regions. All other 
areas within a given spatial system will be defined as 
peripheral. Core regions are territorially organized 
subsystems of society which have a high capacity for 
innovative change. Peripheral regions are subsystems 
whose development path is determined chiefly by core 
region institutions, to which they stand in a relation 
of substantial dependency. Core and periphery to­
gether constitute a complete spatial system. The dom­
ination of the periphery by its core is the result of 
earlier and critical innovations that were incorporated 
into the central authority structure of the system. The 
relations of core regions to their peripheries are fol­
lowing the pattern presented below:
i. Core regions impose a condition of organized 
dependency on their peripheries, by the penetration 
of the periphery by institutions that are effectively 
controlled by core region authorities. Local elites in 
the periphery may be suppressed, neutralized, coopted 
or replaced. Decisions vitally affecting local popula­
tions will henceforward be made by relevant core 
region authorities.
ii. Core regions consolidate their dominance over 
the periphery in a self-reinforcing fashion by six major 
self-reinforcing feedback effects parallel to but ad­
vancing on Perroux’s polarization thesis:1
a. Dominance Effect, or the steady weakening of 
the peripheral economy by a net transfer of nat­
ural, human and capital resources to the core, 
essentially through the mechanisms identified by 
Hirschman2 and which are accompanied by the
b. Information Effect, which is caused by the 
increase of potential interaction within a given 
core region resulting from its own growth in pop­
ulation, production and income, and the
c. Psychological Effect, that is the creation of 
conditions favourable to continued innovation at 
the core region.
d. The Modernization Effect, or the transforma­
tion of existing social values, behaviour and insti­
tutions at the core region in the direction of greater 
acceptance of and conformity with rapid cumula­
tive change through innovation.
e. Production Effects, or the appearance of linked 
systems of innovations, growing specialization 
and increasing economic returns. This process 
involves scale and urbanization economies.
f. Linkage Effects, or the tendency of innovations
1. Cf. François Perroux, La notion de pôle de croissance, 
in op. cit. The above self-reinforcing feedback effects represent 
an advance on Perroux’s and Myrdal’s polarization thesis.
2. Cf. A. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Develop­
ment, in op. cit.
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to breed other innovations by creating new service 
demands as well as new markets for the services 
the core region is itself able to supply to other 
areas. However, the multiplier or linkage effects 
of certain innovations will be greater than for 
others.1
5. Introducing core region innovations into the 
periphery Will augment the flow of information from 
the core to the dependent region. Individuals and 
groups most directly exposed to information origi­
nating in core regions will gradually awaken to the 
periphery’s and their own dependency and powerless­
ness and will tend to emigrate to the core to be drawn 
there into the established structures of authority.
6. Polarized Development in a Hierarchy of Spa­
tial System'· Following always Friedmann’s analysis 
we see that the core regions generally perform a wide 
variety of functions for their dependent areas. They 
organize the dependence of their respective peripheries 
through systems of supply, market, and administra­
tive areas.
As centers of production and consumption, core 
regions organize their peripheries into sets of supply 
areas for further furnishing them the raw materials, 
food stuffs and semi-processed commodities they 
need.
As supply centers, core regions organize their peri­
pheries into sets of market areas (through the estab­
lishment of regional sales and service offices or a 
«colonial» pattern of transport and communications 
services which generally serves the needs of the core 
region more than those of the periphery).
As centers of legitimate decision-making power, 
core regions organize their peripheries into sets of 
administrative areas for the purpose of securing cen­
tral bureaucratic domination over them. The above 
polarization process, formulated by Friedmann, proj­
ects regional development theory into the altogeth­
er different area of «internal colonialism.»
For industrialising nations, the transformation of 
authority-dependency patterns in spatial systems is a 
fundamental condition of development and, conse­
quently, also of sustained economic growth.
Core-periphery systems occur in «nested» hierar­
chies from the world level down to the very local scale 
of a city region. For any spatial system, a loose 
hierarchy of core regions may be identified in accord 
with the functional importance of each core. This 
hierarchy will tend to be asymmetrical, however. 
Because of the asymmetrical nature of their rela­
tionship to higher-order cores and their partial depen­
dency on them, all lower-order cores are also peri­
1. The innovations that Friedmann refers to here are similar 
to the «so-called» industries motrices of Perroux and high link­
age industries of Hirschman.
pheral to a set of dominant core regions. All propo­
sitions concerning core-periphery relations apply also 
to the hierarchical relations among core regions.
Friedmann concludes that up to a certain point in 
time, the self-reinforcing character of core region 
growth will tend to have positive results for. the devel­
opment process of the relevant spatial system even­
tually, however, it will become dysfunctional unless 
the spread effects of core region development to the 
periphery can be accelerated and the periphery’s de­
pendence on the core region reduced. The approach 
of this critical turning point will be registered in grow­
ing political and social tensions between core and 
periphery that are likely to drain core region strength 
and reduce its capacity for further development.
As argued by Friedmann, there are many interre­
lated spatial systems: the world, the multi-nation 
region, the nation, the subnational region and the 
province. Here we will concern ourselves only with 
the nation, the subnational region and the province.
The Contradiction of Expropriation I Appropriation
of Economic Surplus
Another theorist, André Gunter Frank, has also 
attempted to analyze core-periphery relations but has 
focused mainly on the international level, that is the 
relations existing between the metropolitan country 
and the colonized country.2 However, his model could 
be easily applied to the regional context.
Frank analyzes polarization and especially metrop­
olis-satellite polarization in terms of expropriation / 
appropriation of economic surplus. He derives this 
from Marx’s analysis of capitalism which identified 
and emphasized the expropiiation of the «surplus 
value» created by producers and its appropriation 
by capitalists. Frank builds on the theory of Paul 
Baran, who emphasized the role of economic surplus 
in the generation of economic development and also 
of underdevelopment. Baran draws a distinction be­
tween «actual» economic surplus, which is actually 
saved and invested for further production and «po­
tential» or potentially investible economic surplus 
which is not available to society because its monopoly 
structure prevents its production or, if it is produced, 
it is appropriated and wasted through luxury con­
sumption. The income differential between high and 
low income recipients and much of the failure of the 
former to channel their income into productive in­
vestment may also be traced to the monopoly struc­
ture of capitalism.
2. For a thorough presentation of Frank’s theory, cf. his 
books, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, 
in op. cit. and Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolu­
tion, in op. cit.
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The Contradiction of Metropolis-Satellite
Polarization
Frank argues that the extremely contradictory 
character of progress under capitalism applies even 
to different regions of one and the same country. The 
comparatively rapid development of the towns and 
industrial centres is, as a rule, accompanied by decline 
in the agricultural districts.
Thus, the metropolis expropriates economic sur­
plus from its satellites and appropriates it for its own 
economic development. The satellites remain under­
developed for lack of access to their own surplus and 
as a consequence of the same polarization and ex­
ploitative contradictions which the metropolis intro­
duces and maintains in the satellite’s domestic eco­
nomic structure. The combination of these contra­
dictions, once firmly implanted, reinforces the proc­
esses of development in the increasingly dominant 
metropolis and underdevelopment in the ever more 
dependent satellites. His argument is that economic 
development and underdevelopment are the opposite 
faces of the same coin and that both are relative and 
qualitative, in that each is structurally different from 
yet caused by its relation with the other.
Frank further argues that the metropolis-satellite 
contradiction exists within countries, especially under­
developed ones, among their regions and between 
rapid development of the towns and industrial centres 
and stagnation and decline in the agricultural districts. 
This contradictory metropolitan-centre /peripheral- 
satellite relationship, like the process of surplus ex­
propriation-appropriation, runs through the entire 
world capitalist system in chain-like fashion from its 
uppermost metropolitan world center, through each 
of the various national, regional and local enterprise 
centres.
The satellite’s domestic economy reflects the same 
capitalist structure and its fundamental contradictions 
that exist in the metropolis. Once a country or a 
people is converted into the satellite of a metropolis, 
the exploitative metropolis-satellite structure quickly 
comes to organize and dominate the domestic eco­
nomic, political and social life of that people.
Frank’s theory is here presented with certain qual­
ifications. First it is probable that Frank understated 
the possibility that dualisms and imbalances in the 
world or in the national level might be unavoidable 
consequences of «development.» According to Fried­
mann’s argument, for industrializing nations, the 
transformation of authority-dependency patterns in 
spatial systems is perhaps a fundamental condition 
of development, and consequently, also of sustained 
economic growth.1 Second, it seems that Frank under-
1. The economic development of post-war Italy and Germany 
are here relevant examples. Cf. Dr. St. Holland’s, D. Phil. The-
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stated the fact that the failure of channeling economic 
surplus into productive investment cannot be traced 
solely to the monopoly structure of capitalism but to 
the structure of other socio-economic systems as well. 
There is historical evidence showing that feudal and 
mercantilistic societies had «potential» economic 
surplus, which was consumed or invested in non-pro­
ductive assets, such as land, buildings, jewelry, luxury 
consumption and gold hoarding.
However, irrespective of the above minor qualifi­
cations, Frank’s basic principle serves to illustrate 
the process by which the exploitation of the satellite 
region by the metropolis occurs by the expropriation 
and consequent unavailability to the satellite region 
of economic surplus and its appropriation by the core 
region or metropolis. According to Frank, there exists 
a chain-like fashion of exploitation which extends from 
the national metropolises to the regional centres (part 
of whose surplus they appropriate) and from these to 
local centres and so on to large landowners or mer­
chants who expropriate surplus from small peasants 
or tenants, and sometimes even from these latter to 
landless labourers exploited by them in turn.
Cumulative Disequilibrium
Another economist, Gunnar Myrdal, also formu­
lated a theory of regional polarized development in 
terms of a general disequilibrium model.2 He used the 
notion of the «vicious circle» or «circular causation» 
and maintained that «once an exogenous change is 
injected into a system or into a region, this change 
does not call forth countervailing changes, but in­
stead, supporting changes, which move the system 
in the same direction as the first change but much 
further. Because of such circular causation a social 
process tends to become cumulative and often to 
gather speed at an accelerating rate.» He further 
argued that «there is no tendency towards automatic 
self-stabilization in the social system. The system is 
by itself not moving towards any sort of balance 
between forces, but is constantly on the move away 
from such a situation.»
He maintained that if things were left to market 
forces unhampered by any policy interferences, in­
dustrial production, commerce, banking, insurance, 
shipping, science, art, literature, education and higher 
culture generally—would cluster in certain localities 
and regions, leaving the rest of the country more or
sis, Regional Development in Theory and Practice—The Italian 
Case, pp. 60-62, where he places particular emphasis on the 
role of labour supply in permitting «super-normal» growth in 
the more developed regions of Italy and Germany through 
raising their indigenous full employment ceiling and preventing 
cost-push inflation in the key growth initiating sectors of manu­
facturing.
2. Cf. Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdevel­
oped Regions, in op. cit., and An American Dilemma, in op. cit.
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less in a backwater. According to Myrdal the power of 
attraction to-day of a centre has its origin mainly in 
the «historical accident» that something was once 
started there, and not in a number of other places 
where it could equally well or better have been started 
and that the start was met with success.1 Thereafter, 
the ever-increasing internal and external economies, 
such as a working population trained in various crafts, 
easy communications, the feeling of growth and elbow 
room and the spirit of new enterprise, fortified and 
sustained the centre’s continuous growth at the ex­
pense of other localities and regions where instead 
stagnation or regression became the pattern.
The above analysis is very similar to Friedmann’s 
argument that «conditions favourable to innovation 
are usually present at the point of highest potential 
interaction in a 'communication field’, which is to be 
found in large urban systems» as well as to Perroux’s 
argument that «growth and development bring dis­
equilibrium and that the implantation of a develop­
ment pole generates a sequence of socio-economic 
disequilibria.»2
The Backwash Effects
Myrdal further maintained that «expansion in one 
locality has 'backwash effects’ in other localities and 
that the movements of labour, capital, goods and serv­
ices are usually the media through which the cumu­
lative process evolves—upwards in the lucky regions 
and downwards in the unlucky ones and that the 
causes that prompt this cumulative process to evolve 
upwards or downwards are to be found first in the 
selectivity of migration.» Myrdal claims that migra­
tion is always selective with respect to the migrant’s 
age and that the outcome of this selectivity tends to 
favour the rapidly growing communities and disfavour 
the others: furthermore, high fertility rates in poor 
regions add their influence to that of the net emigra­
tion in making the age distribution in these regions 
unfavourable. Second, the causes that prompt the 
cumulative process are to be found in the selectivity 
of capital, which contributes to regional inequality. 
According to Myrdal’s analysis the banking system, 
if not regulated to act differently, tends to become an 
instrument for siphoning off the savings from the 
poorer regions, where there is a lack of new expansio­
nary momentum, to the richer and more progressive- 
ones where returns on capital are higher and secure and 
where the whole «psychological» climate and busi­
1. In the case of Greece the fact that Athens became the 
capital of the new state in 1833 was a «historical accident.» 
Thereafter the process of upward circular causation was success­
fully triggered.
2. Cf. François Perroux, «La firme motrice dans la région»,
dans ΓEconomie du XXe Siècle, in op. cit.
nessmen’s expectations3 are conducive to more invest­
ment, growth and expansion. Third, the causes are to 
be found in the trade selectivity which also operates 
in favour of the richer regions and against the poorer 
ones, because the freeing and widening of the markets 
will often confer such competitive advantages on the 
industries in already established centers of expansion, 
which work under conditions of increasing returns, 
that even the handicrafts and industries existing ear­
lier in the other (poorer) regions are thwarted. Finally, 
they are to be found in other «non-economic factors» 
that closely interact with the above economic ones and 
contribute to the process of regional inequality. Ac­
cording to his analysis, some of these «non-economic 
factors» reflect the poorer regions’ inferior medical 
care and education and these in turn tend to produce 
less healthy and less efficient population: furthermore, 
the entire valuations system of the poor regions tends 
to produce such an imprint of poverty and backward­
ness in their population that it becomes even less sus­
ceptible to the experimental and ambitious aspirations 
of the more developed regions’ population.
All the above frustrating effects of poverty become 
interlocked in circular causation with the biases inher­
ent in the working of migration, capital movements 
and trade and all together interact and operate at 
the expense of the poor regions and to the benefit of 
the rich ones.
The «Spread Effects»
Myrdal claims that together with the backwash 
effects there are also certain centrifugal «spread ef­
fects» of expansionary momentum from the centres 
of economic expansion to other regions and that the 
whole region around a nodal centre of expansion 
usually gains from the increasing outlets of its agri­
cultural products and is stimulated to technical ad­
vance; furthermore, there are centrifugal spread ef­
fects to localities farther away, where favourable con­
ditions exist for producing raw materials for the grow­
ing industries in the centres, and that these spread 
effects might even spur the creation of consumer 
goods industries in the remote less developed local­
ities (regions).4
Thus, according to Myrdal’s analysis the spread 
effects of momentum from a centre of industrial ex­
pansion to other regions weave themselves into a 
cumulative social process by circular causation in the
3. This is similar to the «so-called» warranted or anticipated 
growth rate of Harrod, R.F., Towards a Dynamic Economics. 
Cf. «Fundamental Dynamic Theorems», pp. 63-100, Macmillan 
& Co., Ltd., London, 1960.
4. This analysis is somewhat similar to Mrs. Vera Lutz’ 
argument about the creation of a «natural» demand for indus­
trial products in the less developed regions through the joint 
effects of several processes. Cf. later this paper.
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same fashion as the backwash effects in opposition 
to which they set up countervailing changes.
However, Myrdal stresses that in no circumstances 
do the spread effects establish the assumptions for 
an equilibrium analysis, and that ordinarily even in a 
rapidly developing country, if market forces alone 
were left to decide the outcome, many regions would 
be lagging behind, stagnating or even becoming 
poorer.
Myrdal concludes that the higher the level of eco­
nomic development a country has already attained, 
the stronger the spread effects will usually be. The 
lower the level of economic development of a country, 
the weaker the spread effects will be. In other words, 
the free play of the market forces in a poor country 
will work more powerfully to create regional inequali­
ties and to widen those which already exist.
Having presented above some of the main theories 
which analyze polarized development and core-pe­
riphery relations in a national system, we will now 
survey briefly the important 19th and 20th century 
historical background of Greece because during this 
period the country underwent a deep structural 
transformation of its social and institutional system, 
which resulted in socio-economic spatial transfor­
mation and polarization.
According to Friedmann, an «innovative process» 
can be either technical or institutional and is always 
conducive to structural and spatial transformations. 
In the case of Greece, as will be demonstrated below, 
the innovative process injected into the system in the 
1820s was institutional.
historical background—the Greek case
Introduction
An analysis of the spatial structure and organi­
zation of Greece based on western classical location 
theories and models is hardly possible. Unlike other 
western European countries, which by 1780 had al­
ready entered into the modern industrial stage, Greece 
became an independent national state only after 1832 
and joined the process of industrialization and «cap­
italistic» economy only after the second World war, 
in the 1950s with the assistance of the massive Amer­
ican Aid.
As is well known the Greeks had lived since the 
fifteenth century as a subject people in the Ottoman 
Empire distinguished not by their ethnic singularity 
but as members of the Eastern Orthodox Church. For 
400 years Greece has remained a peripheral province 
of the Ottoman Empire, subject to its particular forms 
of decentralized administration and communal self- 
government.
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After a period of eight years of hard war (1821- 
1829) fighting for its independence from the Turks, 
Greece emerged as a new «modern» highly centralized 
nation, adopting at the same time western political 
and economic institutions. During the 18th and 19th 
century Greece Was infiltrated with secular and utili­
tarian notions of western culture while the great ma­
jority of its population was still essentially eastern 
and traditional in outlook and orientation. We will 
demonstrate below how the cumulative effects of these 
innovations that Friedmann formulates in his theory, 
namely the injection of western secular and utilitarian 
ideas into the Greek «traditional» socio-economic 
space, led to fundamental structural conflicts and to 
the spatial transformation of Greece’s socio-economic 
system.
This sudden transformation of an essentially tra­
ditional agricultural society into one forced and shaped 
on the models of the prevalent western European 
societies, as France, England and Germany were at 
the time, marked and is still today evident in Greece’s 
political, social, economic and spatial imbalances. 
The fact that the country was never allowed to pass 
through the stages of feudalism, mercantilism, indus­
trialism and gradually to post-industrialism, as most 
western countries did, also contributed to the coun­
try’s regional socio-economic dualism. Greece was 
forced to jump from a stage of an «eastern type of 
feudalism» with some aspects of mercantilism being 
present at the same time in it, into a «post-industrial 
stage,»1 without getting a fair chance to industrialize 
and acquire an efficient and large enough middle-class, 
the Schumpeterian «innovative agents», that could 
lead the country into the path of a more balanced 
socio-economic development and growth.
Even though many European countries experience 
regional imbalances and inequalities, these are most 
characteristic of «developing» countries. Dual socie­
ties and economies exist mainly in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America,2 where the process of development 
and modernization was not gradual and where core­
periphery relations are still predominant influences. 
In these countries the innovative process is in full 
swing only in the large and rapidly growing points of 
highest potential interaction. Furthermore, the pattern 
of centre-periphery tensions does not show signs of 
decreasing or levelling down as is the case with United 
States, Germany and Sweden.
1. In 1972 the tertiary sector had a share of 51% in Greece’s 
Gross Domestic Product.
2. It is shortly after his Venezuelan experience that John 
Friedmann formulated his theory of core-periphery relations. 
Myrdal also claims that the free play of the market forces in 
a poor country will work more powerfully to create regional 
inequalities and to widen those which already exist.
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Greece’s case is rather closer to the regional im­
balances of the «third world» countries than to the 
ones experienced by England, United States, France 
and Central Europe.
Socio-Spatial Organization
During the Ottoman occupation (1453-1830) the 
pattern and organization of communities and towns 
in space1 were very different from the present-day 
urban structure. Most of the communities were located 
on the mountains and islands in order to be safe and 
distant from the Turkish feudal lords and army’s 
abuses. It was there in the mountainous regions that 
the first free Greek communities emerged. Later in 
the 18th and 19th century some of them developed 
into small-scale industry and cottage centres as well 
as trade centres.2
In the plains the population was mainly made-up 
of feudal serfs, who were subject to the Turkish feudal 
lords as most of the valleys and flat land Were owned 
by the Turks. The Greek population there was always 
subordinate to the Turkish rule and got little or no 
chance to develop. They were living as kulaks, within 
the system of the Zatrouga type of family, prevalent 
in most South Slav countries of the time.3 There were 
no important towns or communities in the valleys. 
These were only to be found in the mountains and in 
the islands.
The Aegean islands were very different from the 
rest of the mainland. On one hand they were free from 
any Turkish interference, due to their geographic 
isolation, and on the other hand because of the con­
tinuous Frankish presence there.4 The Aegean islands 
had the opportunity to develop into Greek free com­
munities having a system of western type of feudalism 
coexisting with a system of self-government similar to
1. During the 19th c., there were no urban cities in Greece. 
The only metropolitan city was Constantinople. Other big cities 
were located out of Greece, in Asia Minor (Smyrna) and in 
Egypt (Alexandria). Cf. B. Philias, Society and Power in Greece, 
The False Urbanization 1800-1864, B. Makryonitis and Co., 
Athens, 1974.
2. For a detailed description of 19th c. Greek spatial socio­
economic organization see B. Philias, Society and Power, etc. 
in op. cit. See also John Cordatos, The Social Importance of the 
Greek Revolution of 1821, Epikerotita, Athens, 1974. John 
Campbell, Modern Greece, «The Emergence of the New State,» 
Ernest Benn Ltd., London 1968, and K.D. Karavidas, Agrotica, 
published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Athens 1931.
3. K. D. Karavidas in Agrotica, op. cit. describes the Za­
trouga type of family as a rigid, paternalistic and at the same 
time communal social system.
4. During the 13th, 14th and 15th century most of the Greek
islands were occupied by Venice and Genoa. Some of the islands
remained under Venitian rule until the 17th c. and then passed
under the Ottoman iule. Cf. N. Svoronos, «La domination fran­
que» in «La Grèce Asservie», in Histoire de la Grèce moderne, 
Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1972.
the one present in the mountainous villages (kefalo- 
choria). The above system allowed the development 
of a rather urbanized society there made-up by a class 
of shipowners, merchants and rich land-owners.5 *
We thus see that the dynamic Greek space and 
society was rather located and organized mainly in 
the mountains (kefalochoria) and in the coastal pe­
riphery of the country.
This socio-economic spatial pattern in pre-modern 
Greece falls and fits exactly into the model that John 
Friedmann built up in an attempt to present the spatial 
organization of territories preceding the period of mo­
dern industrialism.® He says that «Economic growth 
was limited principally to a few major cities, strategic­
ally located on the coast, at the mouth of rivers, or 
at the crossing of important trade routes. The size of 
these cities was determined by the locally available 
food surplus or by the ability of urban populations 
to capture a fair proportion of the known world’s 
trade. The primitive stage of development of land 
transportation tended to reduce the area surrounding 
the city which came under its immediate economic 
influence. The city-state was a common phenomenon 
and only a few times during the period under consid­
eration were empires brought under a unified admin­
istrative system. The remainder of the settled area 
may be characterized as a feudal village or tribal econ­
omy with small local centers shifting in the case of 
nomadic tribes, more permanent in the case of settled 
peasant agriculture... evolving a self-contained and 
rugged life and remaining more or less isolated from 
urban influence.»
It becomes evident from the above description that 
when Greece entered its period of independence (1821) 
and when it became a new nation state (1832), the 
country was divided and organized in a communal 
regional system, with each region having a different 
identity, economy and stage of development. There 
was no unified national conscience as the country was 
made-up of a mosaic of ethnicities.7 The mentality 
and interests were very parochial indeed.
5. Cf. B. Philias, «The Aegeopelagites Lords» in Society 
and Power in Greece, etc., in op. cit.
6. Cf. John Friedmann, «Regional'Planning: A Problem in 
Spatial Integration» in Papers and Proceedings of the Regional 
Science Association, Volume 5, 1959.
7. During the Ottoman period there were many ethnic groups 
residing and gaining a living in the Greek territory. The popu­
lation was made-up of a mosaic of ethnic groups, mainly by 
Greeks, Turks, Jews, Albanians, Serbs, Vlachs, Koutsovlachs, 
Sarakatsanides, the latter being mainly communities of trans­
human shepherds. They were all subject people to the Ottoman 
Empire’s particular form of decentralized administration and 
communal self-government. Cf. John Cordatos, The Social 
Importance of the Greek Revolution of 1821, in op. cit. and 
History of Greece, Athens, 1958. Also B. Philias, Society and 
Power in Greece, in op. cit, and John Campbell, Modern 
Greece, in op. cit.
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Changes in the pattern of socio-economic spatial 
organization accompanied the transition of the coun­
try from a decentralized administration system to a 
highly centralized one.
After the revolution (1821-1828) and with the 
emergence of the new state (1832), we have the opposite 
phenomenon becoming now more and more evident 
in the Greek space. The communities in the mountains, 
as their only reason for location there was safety and 
isolation from the Turks, a condition that did not 
exist any more, Were leaving the mountains for the 
plains and the provincial towns. The rich land-owners, 
merchants and educated élites left the provincial towns 
and islands and came and established themselves in 
the capital, Athens,1 as it was only there that they 
could have access to the government, the court, the 
university, cultural life, ministries, banks, port facil­
ities and all the other supplementary services. Athens 
as the seat of the administration of public affairs, 
presided over by bureaucrats and politicians, was now 
able to exert substantial pressures upon the life of 
rural populations.2
After the 1830s the towns attracted the rich and 
all the available capital which was now invested in land 
and trade, rarely in manufacture. The towns acquired 
the function and character of urban-trading centres; 
however, none of them became a centre of production.3 
There was no functional specialization in the city- 
hierarchy. Even though the leading class deserted the 
villages for the towns and Athens, the towns lived 
entirely from the resources generated in the villages, 
as Greece’s economy remained mainly agricultural 
up to 1950. The landlords lived in the town but they 
still rented and had their fields cultivated by the peas­
ants. Their main income was generated in the village. 
The towns lived parasytically at the expense of the 
village. The principle of A.G. Frank of expropriation / 
appropriation of economic surplus by the metropolis 
is dramatically relevant here.
After the 1850s the main focus of attraction and 
investment in land and commerce became Athens,
1. Athens in 1853 had 30,000 people, in 1870 had 50,000 and 
in the beginning of the 20th c. had more than 200,000. From 
then on its expansion, as will be demonstrated below, continued 
accelerating. Cf. Bernard Kayser, Human Geography of Greece, 
National Centre of Social Research, Athens, 1968, p. 23 and c.
2. J. Friedmann in «Cities in Social Transformation,» Re­
gional Development and Planning: A Reader, The MIT Press, 
1964 says that cities cannot exert substantial pressures upon the 
provinces as long as the aristocracy, as in medieval Europe and 
in colonial Latin America, live on their estates and shun urban 
life, because then effective political power is dispersed and eco­
nomic expansion drastically curtailed. Economic space must be 
combined with political and social space to become totally ef­
fective.
3. The process of urbanization and parasytic existence of
the towns is described in detail by B. Philias in Society and
Power in Greece - The False Urbanization, in op. cit.
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which now acquired the metropolitan character and 
importance that previously was to be found in Con­
stantinople, Smyrna and Alexandria. Greece became 
one unified market, a condition not existing in the 
previous period. Furthermore, as the natural conse­
quence of a centralized nation was to have a strong 
capital, Athens became the administrative and cultural 
centre of the country.4 Even though at the first 10 
years of the revolution the Greek government was 
moving its headquarters in Peloponnesos from Argos 
to Epidaurus to Nafplion (see Map I), it finally de­
cided in 1833 to make Athens the capital of the newly 
founded Greek state. As the prevalent aspirations of 
the time were highly influenced by European admi­
ration of classical Greece, Athens was the only so­
lution that could give Greece some respectability and 
part of its ancient glory. It is exactly the same prin­
ciple that prompted the Italians to make Rome the 
capital of the new Italian nation-state.
Even though Athens in 1833 was a semi-urban 
town of a few thousand people, it gradually attracted 
to her all the aristocratic elements (phanariotes) from 
Constantinople, men of cosmopolitan culture and 
learning; rich merchant families from the islands; 
some of the military chieftains who had distinguished 
themselves in the Independence war; a growing class 
of shopkeepers and artisans serving the leading class 
and several thousand people performing personal 
services or being literally unemployed and making up 
the urban proletariat. Athens and its university be­
came the cultural centre of Hellenism.5
This redistribution and continuous movement of 
population from villages to towns and then to the 
metropolis denuded and impoverished the periphery, 
caused the decline of all communities having important 
cultural and historical elements, created a huge growth 
pole in the Attica area, made Athens6 a huge ugly 
monster where land speculation and lack of aesthetics 
is everywhere evident, created parasytic, stagnant 
towns all over Greece inhabited again by a migrant
4. This development in Greek space confirms Myrdal’s 
argument that «if things were left to market forces unhampered 
by any policy interferences, industrial production, commerce, 
banking, insurance, shipping, science, art, literature, education 
and higher culture generally— would cluster in certain local­
ities and regions, leaving the rest of the country more or less 
in a backwater and that the power of attraction to-day of a centre 
has its origin mainly in the 'historical accident’ that something 
was once started there and that the start was met with success.» 
Cf. G. Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, 
in op. cit.
5. For a short history of Athens’ evolution, cf. John Camp­
bell, Modern Greece, in op. cit. Cf. also B. Philias, Society and 
Power in Greece, in op. cit.
6. 25% of Athens population are newly arrived migrants. 
Cf. National Statistical Service of Greece, Population Census 
1961 and 1971.
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MAP I. The Territorial Development of the Greek Kingdom, 1832 -1947
Source: John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, Modern Greece, Ernest Benn Ltd., London 1968.
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population, Which looks at Athens as a source for 
values, goals, imitation and income.
It finally created a population of nouveaux-riches 
where social mobility is evident,* 1 social stratification 
weak and where people having lost their cultural ori­
gins and sense of aesthetics believe that what is new, 
modern, Athenian and «European» should be fol­
lowed and imitated.
Even though the present condition in the Greek 
socio-economic space is chaotic, this social dynamism 
and mobility might prove to be a blessing in 100 years 
time provided its social and economic forces are now 
studied, harnassed, organized and the existing im­
balances rectified. If, on the other hand, we consider 
Friedmann’s hypothesis that high densities in large 
urban areas as well as the presence of culturally heter­
ogeneous population groups—in the case of Athens 
the presence of large numbers of migrants—are con­
ditions favourable to innovation and development, 
we might be able to acquire a more favourable ap­
proach towards the present imbalances and dualism 
in Greek socio-economic space.
1. Nicos Mouzelis and Michael Attalides in «Greece,» 
Contemporary Europe, Class, Status and Power,Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London, 1971 write that «although statistical evidence 
is very scant, in terms of some indices bearing upon social mo­
bility Greece appears to be a relatively open society by Western 
standards... Thus, 40 per cent of the students at univeisity are 
the sons of farmers, fishermen, miners, craftsmen, skilled and 
unskilled labourers, i.e. 'the lower urban and rural strata.’» 
Another study made by Alexander, Greek Industrialists, pp. 
44-53, has indicated that 40 per cent of the more important 
Greek industrialists today were the sons of peasants, craftsmen 
and small shopkeepers. Cf. N. Mouzelis and M. Attalides, 
«Greece» in op. cit.
Urban and Regional Hierarchy
As it is shown in Table I and Map II the picture 
that emerges from the present urban structure in 
Greece is that of an «immature» regional structure, 
characterized by a low order of functional speciali­
zation, with many independent small communities 
spread out fairly evenly over the landscape. There are 
still many «gaps» in the structure of the communities, 
with Athens being the «primate» city,2 Salonica the 
«regional city,» both growing disproportionately to 
the rest of the economy, Patras being the «provincial 
city,» and the rest being «local service cities» and in 
their large majority parasitic.3 The above is a very 
crude description of the Greek urban hierarchy as 
further research about its economic and social dy­
namism or stagnation is required.
According to Friedmann «the various regions and 
cities in a national economy may be found at different 
points along the time axis of development... In a 
country having reached a low degree of economic 
maturity it might be possible to find cities and cor­
responding city regions which have attained a high 
level of technical and economic achievement and are 
yet surrounded by relatively primitive and often in­
accessible rural economies.»
2. The above functional hierarchy of cities as well as the 
terms «primate,» «regional,» «provincial» and «local service» 
cities are based on John Friedmann’s model of city-hierarchy 
in the United States. Cf. «Locational Aspects of Economic De­
velopment,» by J.R.P. Friedmann, pp. 215-221 in Land Eco­
nomics, August 1956.
3. For a classification of cities cf. also Bert F. Hoselitz, 
«Generative and Parasitic Cities» in Journal of Economic De­
velopment and Cultural Change, April 1955, pp. 278-294.
TABLE I: A Functional Hierarchy of Greek Urban Agglomerations with More than 40,000 Population
1971 (In Thousands)
LOCATIONAL APPROXIMATE SIZE MAJOR ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS
MATRIX Population Agglom.
Primate City 2,540 Athens
Regional City 537 Salonica
Provincial City 
(sub-dominant)
121 Patras
Local Service City 43 Kalamata-Pylos
(sub-sub-dominant) 85 Heraklion
53 Chania
72 Larissa
88 Volos
40 Ioannina
46 Kavalla
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, P o p u 1 a t i <
Cities drawn from the southern regions of United Sta
Center of manufacturing and of specialized services (finance, publishing, 
sciences, arts, communications, fashions); area of greatest market 
potential
Regional service center, manufacturing, wholesaling, large department 
stores serving regional market; regional administrative center 
Regional service center, manufacturing, wholesaling, regional capital
Provincial or local service center, often rural services; some manufac­
turing (rural and labor-oriented) provincial administrative center
i 1950. Cf. «Lccational Aspects of Economic Development,» in op. cit., p. 215.
Note: Even though Friedmann operated within a city-hierarchy in the United States, a country very different from Greece, in all aspects: size, economic
development, social and political structure, it is believed that the criteria he used for his classification, namely, population size and economic functions 
of cities could be easily applied to classify the Greek urban-hierarchy.
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Map II
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GREECE’S SEVEN ADMINiSTRATIVE REGIONS 
BY LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1971
I Attica and Rest of Central Greece and Aegean Islands
II Central and Western Macedonia
III Peloponnesos and Rest of Western Central Greece and Part of Ionian Islands
IV Thessaly
V Crete
VI Epi rus and Rest of Ionian Islands
VII Eastern Macedonia and Thrace
More Developed Regions 
Intermediate Regions 
IVv.j Peripheral Less Developed Regions
Core Region 
Peripheral Region
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Map IV. Administrative Regions Map V. Statistical Regions
............. ____ ΐ■■■:<— ' *a
I Attica /Rest of Central Greece and Aegean Islands
II Central Western Macedonia
III Peloponnesos /Rest of Western Central Greece and Ionian 
Islands
IV Thessaly
V Crete
VI Epirus and Rest of Ionian Islands
VII Eastern Macedonia and Thrace
Friedmann maintains that «many primate and 
even regional cities and city regions in developing 
countries have reached a much higher level of devel­
opment than the rest of the country on which they 
feed and which continues in its economically backward 
condition. Primitive and advanced economies exist 
thus side by side and are in competition with each 
other.»1 This is exactly the case in Greek socio-eco­
nomic space.
Furthermore, it becomes evident from Map III, 
Which shows the seven administrative regions of the 
country, that Thrace, Epirus, Ionian Islands, Crete 
and Aegean Islands form a circle around the Greek 
mainland and especially around the core region of 
Attica (Athens). The regions forming the circle will be 
called periphery and it will be shown below how their
1. John Friedmann in «Locational Aspects of Economic 
Development» in op. cit., attempts to establish criteria for 
measuring the «maturity» of regional structures, pp. 218-221.
I Greater Athens Area
II Rest of Central Greece /Euboea 
HI Macedonia
IV Peloponnesos
V Thessaly
VI Crete
VII Epirus
VIII Thrace
IX Aegean Islands 
X Ionian Islands
backward economy exists side by side and in com­
petition with this of the core region of Attica. Map III 
also shows the regions’ economic development: Attica 
/Rest of Central Greece and Central Western Ma­
cedonia are the more developed regions; Thessaly 
and Peloponnesos are the intermediate regions; 
Thrace, Epirus, Ionian Islands, Crete and Aegean 
Islands are the less developed ones. However, the 
division of the country in 1970 in the above seven 
administrative regions does not reflect their actual 
economic development. Note that the Aegean Islands 
have been incorporated under the rich Attica (Athens) 
region. As for the Ionian Islands these have been 
split-up half under the Peloponnesos region and 
the rest under the Epirus region. In strictly economic 
development terms the peripheral backward regions 
are made-up by Thrace, Epirus, Ionian Islands, Crete 
and Aegean Islands.
It is believed that the division of the country in the 
above ten statistical regions, established by the Na­
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tional Statistical Service of Greece since 1940 for 
data collection, gives a more realistic picture of the 
country’s regional economic development than its 
division in the above seven administrative regions.
In this paper special care was taken to present 
information and evidence according to the statistical 
division of the country in ten regions, whenever avail­
able. In the cases when this was not possible, infor­
mation is given following the administrative division 
of the country in seven regions.
Regional and Local Government and Administration
As it was mentioned above during the Ottoman 
rule the governing system and regional administration 
of the country was a form of decentralized administra­
tion and communal self-government. It was actually 
a mixture of oriental regional decentralization and 
western-type mediaeval city-state system.
The decentralized regional administrative system 
that the Ottoman empire exercized from its capital 
in Constantinople was entirely different from the pres­
ent-day highly centralized system with which the 
government in Athens administers the rest of the 
country. The Greek independent community was a 
functional element of the general socio-economic 
structure of the oriental type of production1 and was 
characterized by self-sufficiency, self-consumption, a 
minimal monetary economy and a production geared 
mainly to self-consumption rather than the market.
A typical model of the self-governed Greek com­
munity was that of an assembly of the people who 
elected annually two councillors, who in consultation 
with the clergy regulated the internal life of the com­
munity, public order and worship, health and schools. 
They promulgated local market by-laws and arbitrated 
in internal disputes. Aggregate amounts of taxation 
or tribute demanded by the central Ottoman govern­
ment in Constantinople were divided among the citizen 
body and the sum was collected.2
Changes in the pattern of government accompanied 
the transition of part of the Greek world from a pe­
ripheral province of the Ottoman empire to a small 
nation-state on the European model. It was first by 
Capodistrias, the President of the new Greek State, 
in 1828 that the processes of centralized administra­
tion were given an institutional form. Although the 
election of local councillors appeared to continue the
1. B. Philias in Society and Power in Greece, in op. cit., says 
that «the oriental structure of production was characterized by 
an economy which was neither unified nor homogeneous; there 
was no monetary economy or specialization of labour,» p. 12.
2. There are many conflicting arguments on the subject.
Philias andCordatos, in op. cit., argue that the elected council­
lors were exploiting the people. On the other hand, Karavidas,
in op. cit., argues that the system was democratic and fair and 
that the councillors and clergy were highly respected people.
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tradition of local self-government the extraordinary 
commissioner (appointed by Capodistrias to admin­
ister each province) and later the Nomarch (the 
prefect) presided over the electoral committee, inval­
idating the candidature of persons uncongenial to the 
government and in some instances suggesting candi­
dates and enforcing their election. The prefect (the 
provincial representative of the central government) 
had also a veto over budgetary and taxation decisions 
and in practice could effectively suppress any measure 
which displeased him and the government.3
Later on and until the present time a centralized 
and inflexible administration consolidated the changes 
already attempted by Capodistrias. In 1833 the state 
was divided into ten nomarchies (prefectures), 42 
eparchies (sub-prefectures) and 468 demes (com­
munes). Since then and up to the present time there 
have been several modifications to the system. The 
number and division of the country in different pre­
fectures as Well as the name given to them kept chan­
ging, but the underlying spirit and system of govern­
ing them remained the same.
Nomarchs (prefects) and eparchs (sub-prefects) 
were directly nominated by the central government. 
The demarch (mayor), too, Was appointed by the 
government from a list of three candidates elected by 
a restricted number of the more highly taxed members 
of the demos (commune).
The governing of each prefecture was delegated to 
the nomarch (prefect), who was directly responsible to 
and under the Ministry of Interior. The rest of the 
functions and institutions, such as traffic, education, 
health, agriculture, industry, etc., were not incorpo­
rated under the authority of the nomarchia (prefec­
ture), but came under the realm of authority of the 
other ministries.4 Thus, We had no comprehensive 
local government at the level of the prefecture (county) 
or of the commune. The pattern that emerged was 
this of a highly vertically centralized government, 
while at the same time being horizontally divided and 
diffuse. In other words, there existed a highly central­
ized type of regional administration, where the differ­
ent regions and prefectures had no authority to act 
whatsoever, all the instructions and decisions came 
from the central Ministry of Interior in Athens, while 
at the same time there existed a pronounced horizontal 
diffusion of functions and responsibilities amongst 
ministries at all levels, a situation that created a bu­
reaucratic state and brought frustration, inefficiency,
3. Cf. John Campbell in Modern Greece, «The Emergence 
of the New State» in op. cit. Also N. Svoronos, «La Grèce 
libérée», dans L’histoire de la Grèce moderne, in op. cit.
4. For a detailed description of local government see M. A. 
Mathioudakis and B. K. Andronopoulos, Decentralization and 
Self-Government, Historical Evolution-Present Situation (in 
Greek), Pergamali, Athens, 1974, p. 25 and c.
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irresponsibility and delay in the execution of affairs.
The above pattern of local and regional1 adminis­
tration and division was modelled on the French 
regional division of the country in departments, dis­
tricts and communes. This system Was first introduced 
in France in 1790 and was later used by Bavaria and 
other German states, in order to fight and weaken 
feudalism and local divisions and to unite the nation.2
It was this same philosophy that inspired the new 
Greek élites in their efforts in introducing a new ad­
ministration system. Thus, the new state under the in­
fluence of the western concept of progress intervened 
in the affairs of villages in a manner which brought 
few improvements but disproportionate frustration. 
The closer the administrative supervision of the coun­
tryside, as far as the very difficult communications 
allowed, the more secure the government’s control 
of the country and the more the consolidation of 
power by the core region towards the periphery.
Moreover, under the military régime (1967-1974), 
the officials of local government, i.e. the councillors 
and the mayor, were appointed by the central admin­
istration, thus weaving the last trait of local self- 
government and rendering government’s control over 
the country even tighter.3
The reaction of individuals and factions in pro­
tecting their interests against the interference of gov­
ernment officials resulted in a search for protecting 
patrons in the core region (Athens) with political 
influence, a situation which inevitably Weakened the 
traditional solidarity of the community, infiltrated 
and dominated Greek political life.4 Furthermore, the 
very constitution of the demes (communes) added to 
this weakening of local institutions, as these were 
arbitrary administrative areas generally including a
1. The notion of region and regional administration emerged 
in Greece only during the period 1970-1973 and itwas then that 
the country was divided in seven administrative regions. Each 
region was divided in four to eleven prefectures. It was an at­
tempt, for the first time in Greece, to introduce a rational com­
prehensive regional administrative system. See Maps III and IV. 
However, the regional governors still remained under the autho­
rity of the ministry of interior and central government control 
became even tighter. In 1973 the above system changed and the 
country was divided again in 51 prefectures. The prefect 
remained the central government’s representative in the various 
prefectures. As for the functions of the regional governors, 
these were now carried out and performed from the different 
ministries in Athens. Cf. M. A. Mathioudakis and B. K. Andro- 
nopoulos, in op. cit., pp. 269-283.
2. Cf. M. A. Mathioudakis, in op. cit., p. 34.
3. Cf. John Campbell, «The Greek Countryside» in Modern 
Greece, in op. cit.
4. The pattern of patronage and privileges in Greek political
life is analysed in detail by John Campbell, in op. cit.; by Friedl, 
E. 1962, Vassilika: A Village in Modern Greece, Holt and Ri­
nehart, New York; by B. Philias in Society and Power in Greece, 
in op. cit. and by N. Mouzelis, «Greece» in Contemporary
Europe, in op. cit.
number of villages, often with a history of long-stand­
ing hostilities.
If we would like now to refer to the model brought 
forward by Friedmann, it becomes evident from the 
above presentation of the political innovation and 
change injected into the previous «traditional» system 
of governing the country, that the core region (Ath­
ens) imposed conditions of organized dependency 
on its peripheries, by the penetration of the periphery 
by institutions (prefectures and communes) that were 
effectively controlled by core region authorities (the 
ministries). Decisions virtually affecting local popu­
lations were henceforward made only by relevant core 
region authorities. The core region organized the 
dependence of its respective peripheries through a 
system of administrative areas, for the purpose of 
securing central bureaucratic domination over them.
As for the power game and conflicts that emerged 
out of the new situation in Greece there was on one 
hand neutralization of some of the traditional élites 
(such as the revolution’s fighters, heroes and officers) 
and on the other hand cooption between the aristoc­
racy and middle-class and a thorough merger of the 
two.
The process of cooption was the following: The 
conflicting interests of the new counter-élites (such as 
the engineers of the revolution,5 the recently arrived 
king and his foreign advisors) and those of the tra­
ditional élites (such as the ship-owners, rich land- 
owners, army’s officers, etc.) were united and the 
conflicts compromised in order to preserve the in­
terests and status quo of an élite class, which from now 
on ran the country in the way that best suited its in­
terests. The rest of the population never participated 
in the political affairs and life of the country. Parlia­
mentary life and government served only as a façade 
to support and promote the interests of the governing 
élite.6
During the 19th and 20th century whatever dualism 
or political parties arose in the country reflected the 
interests and the efforts of the two main middle-class 
parties to preserve their power and their complicated 
network of privileges and patronage in the govern­
ment machine. It was perhaps this lack of people’s 
participation in political life as well as their lack 
of political awareness and education—political life 
meaning for most of Greeks having an extended 
circle of patrons and connections in the core region
5. The engineeis of the Greek revolution were mainly Greek 
merchants and students living abroad (in Europe). They were 
highly influenced by the ideas of the 18th c. French Revolution.
6. The lack of people’s participation in political life as well 
as the conservative and reactionary nature of most Greek gov­
ernments and main parties are described in detail by B. Philias, 
in op. cit.;jby John Campbell, in op. cit.; by John Cordatos, in 
op. cit. and by N. Svoronos, in op. cit.
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(Athens)—that led to political apathy, cynicism and 
to the eight years of dictatorship (1967-1974).
There Was only one interlude in the 1940s of a 
communist party acquiring power and a following and 
this «episode» further divided and caused a schism 
in the country between «communists» and «non-com­
munists,» denuded the provinces and the periphery, 
and drove rural population to towns as well as abroad 
to Australia and America.1
When in the 1950s the country came under the 
American sphere of influence, there was an impetus 
in economic reconstruction, which was again centered 
around Greater Athens Area.2 This new development 
created a profound socio-economic spatial dualism in 
the country, made Athens the metropolitan giant of 
all Greece and aggrevated even further the already 
existing imbalance. As will be demonstrated below 
this pattern accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s— 
perhaps with the only exception of Salonica region, 
which in the late 1960s developed into a counter-pole 
to Athens.
Despite the nominal efforts of all governments 
after 1960 to control Athens’ expansion, which now 
started to spill over to Attica, Central Greece and 
Euboea, the trend did not reverse but rather acceler­
ated.
Summary
We thus see that the outcome of the conflict related 
to the concepts of power and authority in the terri­
torially organized Greek socio-economic spatial 
system resulted in the gradual cooption of the differ­
ent élite groups and into the creation of an adaptive 
system of authority-dependency relations. The core 
region started organizing the periphery into depen­
dency by steadily weakening the periphery’s economy 
by expropriation of economic surplus, by a net trans­
fer of natural, human and capital resources to it and 
by penetrating and transforming the periphery’s 
social values, behaviour and institutions in the di­
rection of greater acceptance and conformity with its 
own value system.
Also, as predicted by Friedmann’s theory of core­
periphery relations and Myrdal’s theory of regional 
polarization, we see that the social change and «devel­
opment» that occurred transformed the established 
socio-economic spatial structure by attracting creative 
or innovative personalities or simply the country’s 
élites and consequently all economic activities, science, 
education and culture into the enclave of accelerated
1. Cf. Bernard Kayser, Human Geography of Greece, in 
op.cit.
2. Cf. B. Kayser, in op. cit., also John Campbell, in op. cit. 
and Benjamin Ward, Greek Regional Development, Center of
Economic Research, Athens, 1965.
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change, which was the new capital Athens. Thereafter, 
Athens became the point of highest potential inter­
action in the Greek «communication field,» the core 
region and the centre of the country, whose growth 
was sustained and fortified by ever-increasing internal 
and external economies at the expense of the rest of 
the country which remained in a backwater.
Furthermore, we see the civil war (1944-1949) 
producing a shock into the system and further trans­
forming the existing spatial structure by driving rural 
people to towns.
Finally, in the 1950s, we have a «technical» inno­
vation introduced into the system, namely American 
capital and rapid industrialization of the country, 
focused around Athens and further transforming the 
socio-economic spatial pattern of the country to the 
benefit of the core region and at the expense of the 
periphery.
regional economic growth 
and development
Introduction
After having demonstrated above how the Greek 
socio-economic space developed and how a system 
of core-periphery relations came about due to insti­
tutional changes in the country during the previous 
century, it will now be demonstrated how the core 
region (Athens) gradually became a «growth pole.» 
The models proposed by Friedmann and Myrdalwere 
used in order to analyze the core-periphery relations 
in Greece. The model proposed by Perroux will now 
be used in order to analyze and explain the process 
of Greater Athens area becoming a «development» 
or «growth» pole.3 However, we wish to draw attention 
to the fact that the analysis on Perroux’s lines is only 
relevant in the Greek case as a complementary anal­
ysis to the already existing dualism in the country 
and not as the main and primary explanation of it. 
In other words, the economic effects of the «growth 
pole» or «polarization» process formulated by Per­
roux and Myidal are here regarded as being super­
imposed on a socio-economic spatial system, which 
was already characterized by core-periphery relations. 
The attraction of Athens acting as an economic/in­
dustrial «growth pole» became only relevant in the
3. By «growth pole» Perroux means «a pole which induces 
growth in one or more economic variables, such as population, 
income, production, a.o., but does not question or alter the 
existing socio-economic equilibrium and status quo.» By «de­
velopment pole» Perroux means «the combination of social 
and mental changes in a population enabling it to increase in 
a cumulative and stable fashion its global real product.» Cf. 
M. Penouil, «Politique régionale et pôles de croissance», in 
R. Petrellas, Le développement régional en Europe, Mouton, 
1971.
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late 1950s, when Greece entered its industrialisation 
stage. Prior to that period Athens was still dominant, 
but only as an administrative and commercial center.
Pôles de croissance et la notion de développement
According to the theory formulated by Perroux, 
growth and development are never uniformly distrib­
uted in space.1 They manifest themselves in certain 
points from where expansion or contraction effects 
may spread out. According to his theory a growth pole 
may consist of an economic unit or a group of eco­
nomic units, a simple or complex one. It may be a 
firm, an industry, a combination of industries, which 
are considered to be dynamic and propulsive when 
they generate expansion effects to the rest of the 
region.
«Although Perroux is not very clear in his con­
ceptualization of the terms 'dynamic’ firms and 
'leading’ industries, it seems evident that the most 
remarkable characteristics of a 'dynamic propulsive 
firm’ are that it is relatively large, generates signifi­
cant growth impulses to its environment, has a high 
ability to innovate and finally belongs to a fast growing 
sector. The features of 'leading propulsive’ industries 
are that they appear to be relatively new ones, oper­
ating at a technically advanced level in markets with 
high income elasticities for their products. Moreover, 
such industries exert a considerable influence on their 
environment through inter-industry linkages.»2
The theory of growth poles maintains that entre­
preneurial innovation is a dominant factor in explain­
ing the growth process, which takes the form of a 
succession of dynamic sectors (industries motrices) 
or poles (pôles de croissance), through time. A region­
al importance has been given to the pole concept in 
the relevant literature by emphasizing that growth is 
concentrated in various spatial loci as well as in certain 
leading and dominant industrial branches, which, as 
demonstrated above, are specializing in intermediate 
manufacturing rather than in basic industry or con­
struction. The notion of economic dominance is close­
ly related to that of development poles and is also 
related to the effects generated by a propulsive in­
dustry (industrie motrice) to the rest of the region.
1. Cf. François Perroux, (1) «La notion de pôle de croissan­
ce» in op. cit. (2) «Les points de développement et les foyers de 
progrès» in op. cit. (3) «La firme motrice dans une région et la 
région motrice» in op. cit. Cf. also Niles M. Hansen, «The 
Concepts of Development Poles and Development Axes» in 
French Regional Planning, p. 105-122, U. P. Edinburgh, 1968.
2. Quoted from Tormod Hermansen, «Development poles
and Development Centres» in Kuklinski’s Growth Poles and
Growth Centres in Regional Planning, Mouton, 1972. Stuart
Holland in Regional Development in Theory and Italian 
Practice, 1971 also argues on similar lines on the concepts of 
«dynamic» and «key» industries.
Perroux maintains that the effects generated may be 
internal to the industry itself, i.e. its own growth gener­
ates increased investment, employment and distrib­
ution of factor payments, including profits which 
may be retained and reinvested. Its own growth also 
generates structural changes involving lateral or 
horizontal production increases, the so-called «Per­
roux effect.» The above process also generates ex­
ternal effects to the propulsive industry, i.e. vertically 
and horizontally or backward and forward linkage 
induced effects,3 which may be analyzed Within the 
framework of input-output matrices (or a Leontief- 
type matrix).
According to Hermansen4 «an industry is said 
to exert a strong backward linkage effect if it has a 
high ratio of intermediary inputs delivered from other 
industries to its total production. Such an industry 
tends to dominate its input-delivery industries in the 
sense that it induces expansionary or stagnatory 
forces into them depending upon its own trend of 
development. According to Perroux such a backward 
linkage dominating industry can be said to be a 'key’ 
industry in so far as it determines the amount of 
expansion induced in depending industries relative to 
its own expansion.5 A forward linkage industry on the 
other hand tends to be dominated and to have a high 
ratio of intermediary deliveries to final demand. Thus, 
a forward linkage industry will depend on other in­
dustries for determination of its rate of expansion. 
However, as a producer of important intermediaries 
to other industries it will be able to induce expansion 
in these by transmitting innovations or effects of 
innovations forwards.»
In other words, the propulsive industry or in­
dustries (industries motrices) tend to increase the 
purchase of intermediary goods and services made by 
other firms, they also induce increases in other firms’ 
investment and employment as well as in other firms’ 
sale of final goods, at reduced prices, to other inter­
mediary firms or to the final consumer,
According to the above analysis it becomes evident 
that we have the interplay of many different effects 
acting on the region. Hansen® maintains that «we have
3. The concepts of backward and forward linkage induced 
effects have been developed by Hirschman in Strategy for Devel­
opment, op. cit. Although Perroux does not employ these terms 
himself, it appears clear that the same notions play an important 
role in his theory and that he has been influenced by Hirsch- 
man’s use of these concepts which were originally developed by 
Chenery and Watanabe (1957).
4. Cf. Tormod Hermansen, «Development Poles and Devel­
opment Centres» in op. cit.
5. The concept of key industry was, however, rejected by 
Perroux (1961).
6. Cf. Niles M. Hansen, «Regional Economic Theory» in 
French Regional Planning, in op. cit., where he introduces the 
concepts of «Keynes multiplier,» «Scitovsky effect,» «Aftalion
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the effects of the classic 'Keynes multiplier" based on 
increased marginal propensities to consume induced 
by income increases; the 'Scitovsky effect’ relating 
to the interplay of prices among related sectors and 
enterprises; the 'Aftalion effect’ involving increased 
investment resulting from the operation of the accel­
erator principle in connection with increases in final 
demand; there is also the 'psychological polarization 
effect’ referring to the impacts on investment deci­
sions of small and medium-sized firms induced by the 
creative activities of dominant propulsive sectors;1 
the 'agglomeration effect’ brought about by the accu­
mulation of complimentary activities around the pro­
pulsive industries as well as 'location effects’ gener­
ated by the creation of new modes of transport and 
communication in the region.»
According to Perroux «supply and demand ex­
pand, new opportunities are now open to local pro­
ducers. On the whole, the effects that the propulsive 
industry has in the region are positive. They bring 
about a total change in the region’s socio-economic 
structure in such a way that the region’s global real 
net product increases.» However, Perroux realizes the 
further effects that polarization has on the national 
space of a country and further comments that «growth 
is disequilibrium. Development is disequilibrium. The 
implantation of a development pole generates a se­
quence of socio-economic disequilibria. The pole 
tends to distribute salaries and additional economic 
revenue without necessarily increasing the local pro­
duction of consumption goods; it tends to displace 
the labour-force and uproot it from its place of ori­
gin without necessarily providing a new social milieu 
for it. It concentrates within an area or a region, in a 
cumulative fashion, investment, traffic, technical and 
economic innovation without necessarily providing 
any advantages to the other areas out of the region, 
which are less developed or even retarded.»2 Perroux 
concludes by suggesting that «the economic devel­
opment of a nation should not be left to automatic, 
spontaneous market forces.» He further stresses that 
«in the present time the large industrial firms by 
using modern technology, which requires extensive
effect,» «psychological polarization,» «agglomeration and 
location effect,» pp. 113-114.
1. The notion of «investment psychology of firms» is also 
used by Harrod in his theory of warranted and natural growth 
rates in «Fundamental Dynamic Theorems,» Towards a Dy­
namic Economics, pp. 63-100, but in a national and not in a 
regional dimension.
2. Cf. Francois Perroux, «La firme motrice dans une région 
etja région motrice», dans L’Economie du XXe Siècle, in op. cit. 
Even though Perroux mentions the negative effects that regional 
polarization might have on the national space, he does not 
extend his argument to Myrdal’s «backwash effects» that the 
core region might generate at the expense of the less developed 
regions.
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fixed indivisible capital, render the market system 
imperfect and 'impure’. » He believes that «the mar­
ket becomes inevitably arbitrary.»3
The Theory of Warranted and Natural Growth Rates
The instability and disequilibrium of growth in a 
national context have also been analyzed by Harrod 
in his theory of warranted (anticipated) and natural 
(potential) growth rates and have been employed by 
Holland in his analysis of regional disequilibrium 
and polarization.4
Harrod5 maintains that once an initial upwards 
stimulus to the growth of the system occurs, i.e. when 
the natural rate of growth pushes up or in the case 
when Investment exceeds Savings, the reaction of 
enterpreneurs to the expansion on income will cause 
them to invest over and above that rate which they had 
anticipated would satisfy the expansion of demand for 
their products, while the multiplier effect of their 
investment will generate further demand reinforcing 
the increased excess of demand over and above their 
second-round anticipations. In other words,the natural 
rate of growth jumps up pulling up the warranted rate 
of growth in a self-reinforcing fashion. Inversely, in 
the event of an unexpected contraction, the reaction 
of enterpreneurs will be to cut back in second and 
third round investment in order to avoid being left 
with spare capacity on their hands. This reaction will 
ensure a further downwards movement in demand and 
investment. This theory is a behavioural theory of 
growth and considers the effects of divergence between 
actual and anticipated growth rates on the investment 
psychology and decision-making of firms. It also 
explains the way the economy moves from an equi­
librium growth path into either cumulative expansion 
or contraction of a self-reinforcing kind.
Harrod’s theory represents the national dimension 
of the cumulative self-reinforcing regional disequi­
librium of Myrdal’s and Holland’s theories.
Having presented the above disequilibrium growth 
theories, we will now proceed in analyzing Greece’s 
economic dualism and try to point out in what in­
stances Greece fits the above models or theories 
and in what instances it does not.
3. Perroux seems to be aware of the developing monopolistic 
nature and power of the big league firms, but does not extend 
his argument to include monopolistic practices and prices. For 
a fuller analysis of monopolistic practices of big «leader» firms, 
cf. Stuart Holland, «The Trend to Monopoly» in Strategy for 
Socialism, Spokesman Books, 1975.
4. Cf. Stuart Holland, «Interregional Factor Migration, 
and Keynesian Growth and Trade Cycle Models» in Regional 
Development, etc.
5. Cf. Hariod, «Fundamental Dynamic Theorems» in op. 
cit.
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regional economic development—the Greek case
Background
In the 1800s the character of the Greek economy 
was on one hand agricultural and on the other mercan- 
tilistic. At that time we had two forces operating 
against the Greek economy. First, after 1815, when 
the Anglo-French wars finished and the sea circulation 
was once more free again and open to everyone, the 
Aegean islands lost their competitive advantage in 
the sea and their economic development was now 
hampered. Second, with the rapid industrialization of 
British and other European products, Greek products 
(such as textiles) ceased to be internationally compe­
titive any more. Furthermore, because of a lack in 
roads and because of an insufficient domestic market 
the country did not attempt and could not industrial­
ize. Thus, until the second world War the economy 
remained in a pre-urban state of mercantilism. The 
country’s industrial production was limited to small 
shipbuilding, the processing of olives, and simpler 
consumer goods such as textiles and pottery. It was 
mainly Greek foreign commerce and the size of the 
merchant marine which Were contributing to the 
country’s gross domestic product.1 All the economic 
surplus that the land-owners, the merchants and ship­
owners accumulated went into hoarding, conspicuous 
consumption and lavish living. The Protestant ethic 
of work, saving and investing in capital and productive 
goods was Dowhere evident in Greek society. This 
trend and economic behaviour are still evident in 
Greek economy.
It was the massive American aid in the 1950s that 
was poured into the country in order to protect it from 
the so-called «communist threat»—according to the 
Truman dogma—that triggered the industrialization 
process. In this way the country was brought under 
the American political and economic influence.
After the 1950s the industrialization and invest­
ment in manufacturing and infrastructure started in 
the Greater Athens area and gradually extended to 
its larger region encompassing the whole of Attica, 
Euboea and Eastern Central Greece as well as part 
of Northern Peloponnesos, as the rest of the country 
was lacking the necessary infrastructure and services, 
such as roads, administrative services, banking, credit 
facilities and qualified trained personnel.
Greece is presently well past the beginning phases 
of economic development and would appear to have 
at least reached the Rostow’s take-off stage, if not
1. Cf. John Campbell, «Economic Dilemmas» in Modern
Greece, in op. cit. Cf. also N. Svoronos, L’histoire de la Grèce 
moderne, in op. cit.
entered upon sustained growth.2 Part of this good 
performance was the result of recovery from the 
disturbances of the civil war (1945-1949), part was 
due to American Aid, part was the result of the devel­
opment mechanisms set in motion and successfully 
reinforced in the decade 1957-1966 and part was due 
to the inflow into the country of foreign currency in 
the form of emigrants’ remittances and tourists’ 
receipts.
However, despite substantial progress in the past, 
Greece’s economic structure and character is still 
agricultural and commercial. As Table II shows, 
40.51% of its labour force is still employed in the pri­
mary sector, 32% in the tertiary and only 25.60% in 
manufacturing.
TABLE 11: Economically Active Population Classified by Main 
Sector of Economic Activity
Greece Total Greece Total
Sector 1961 1971
Agriculture, Livestock, etc. 53.87 40.51
Extraction, Manufacturing, 
Construction 19.16 25.60
Trade, Transport, Services 23.62 32.00
Not Declared 3.34 1.88
100.00 100.00
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1971, 1973 
P. 77.
TABLE III: Gross Domestic Product by Economic Sector
Sector
1957-60
%
1965
%
1972
%
Primary Sector 31.00 24.96 18.58
Secondary Sector 26.00 26.34 31.94
Mining 1.11 1.37
Manufacturing 16.52 20.14
Power 1.71 1.94
Construction 7.00 8.49
Tertiary Sector 43.00 48.69 49.47
Trade 10.85 10.70
Transport - Communications 6.90 7.70
Banking - Insurance 2.32 2.53
Dwellings 8.76 7.92
Services
Public Admin. - Health 
Defence - Education
12.71 12.93
Other Services 7.15 7.69
Gross Domestic Product 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: For the 1957-60 period, B. Ward, "Greece and Economic Devel­
opment”, in Greek Regional Development, p. 
11, in op. cit. For 1965 and 1972, Statistical Yearbook 
of Greece, 1973, p. 360 "Gross domestic product and 
national income: 1965-1972.”
2. Cf. Benjamin Ward, Greek Regional Development, in 
op. cit.
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Even though there have been some structural 
changes in the country’s economy, as Table III shows, 
and the secondary sector is in 1972 contributing 
31.94% to the Gross Domestic Product as compared 
to 26.34% in 1965, and the share of the primary sector 
has diminished and is contributing in 1972 only 18.58% 
to GDP as compared with 24.96% in 1965 and 31% in 
the period 1957-1960, the service sector in the eco­
nomy has expanded and is contributing 49.47% to 
GDP as compared with 43% in the 1957-1960 period.
Even though the country’s GDP doubled between 
the period 1965 fo 1972 with a growth rate of 6.2% per 
annum for the period 1950 to 1961 and with an in­
creased annual growth rate of 7% for the period 1961- 
1971, there are still fundamental weaknesses in the 
country’s economy at both the national and regional 
level.
Agriculture
Though Greek agriculture produces less than a 
fifth of the domestic product, 40% of the active pop­
ulation still is employed in the sector. The vast major­
ity of just over a million Greek farms are under 121 /2 
acres (50 stremmata) and the landless agricultural 
population is small. Most of the land is not very fertile 
and yields of basic crops are low by western European 
standards. Productivity is further inhibited by frag­
mentation of the farms.1 Though there is a govern­
ment program for consolidation of these small units, 
very little consolidation has actually been carried out. 
There is a widespread feeling among agronomists that 
there is substantial underemployment in agriculture, 
though some conflicting evidence has recently been 
presented (by Papandreou, Pepelasis, Yannopoulos, 
Campbell)2 as well as by the Federation of Greek 
Industrialists,3 showing that there are acute seasonal 
shortages of labour in the agricultural areas due to 
mass emigration to the towns and abroad.
In structure and organization the sector is neither 
modern nor mechanized. It is subject as much to 
considerations of a family’s subsistence needs and 
labour resources as to simply commercial interests 
and responses. Agriculture neither answers existing
1. Cf. John Campbell, Modern Greece, in op. cit., p. 329, also 
K. Thomson, Farm Fragmentation in Greece, Athens, 1962 and 
B. Ward, Greek Regional Development, in op. cit. pp. 17-19.
2. A. Papandreou, A Strategy for Greek Economic Develop­
ment, Centre of Economic Research, Athens, 1962, indicates 
that Greece may be facing a labour shortage by 1970. Also A. 
Pepelasis, Surplus Labour in Greek Agriculture 1953-1960, Cen­
tre of Economic Research, Athens, 1962. Cf. also George Yan­
nopoulos, «Workers and Peasants» in Greece under Military 
Rule, Seeker and Warburg, London, 1972, p. 121 and John 
Campbell, Modern Greece, in op. cit., p. 324.
3. Federation of Greek Industrialists, Labour Market and
Wage Structure in Greek Industry, «Employment in Agricul­
ture,» pp. 76-77, Athens, 1974.
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market demand effectively nor realizes its potential 
productive capacity. Agricultural exports are neither 
sufficiently secure nor varied. In addition, the policy 
of price support for wheat—mainly for political 
reasons—has prevented the proper development of 
valuable labour-intensive export crops, especially cot­
ton, fruits and vegetables.4
Pesmazoglu5 reports that there has been a marked 
reduction in the rate of increase in output and income 
from agriculture during the period 1963 to 1971, as 
Table IV shows, and that the target rate of 5.2% in­
crease set in the 1968-1972 programme was two and 
a half times the rate actually achieved. He further 
maintains that «despite mass emigration from the 
rural areas the rates of increase of per capita income 
from agriculture declined significantly after 1967, as 
shown in Table IV.»
TABLE IV: Average Annual Compound 
per Capita Incomes
Rate of Increase in
Per Capita income Per Capita income
from agriculture from non-agr. activities
In constant prices In constant prices
1963-66 (four years) 6.0 6.6
1967-70 (four years) 4.5 5.3
1968-71 (four years) 3.8 6.3
S o u r c e : John Pesmazoglu, "The Greek Economy”, in Greece un­
der Military Rule, in op. cit. p. 81.
Pesmazoglu further claims that the movement of 
income per capita certainly differed by crops and var­
ying rates of emigration, with probably stagnant or 
slowly increasing per capita incomes from traditional 
crops such as tobacco, currants and sultanas and 
wheat.6
He further maintains that the decline since 1967 
of the rate of increase in agricultural product cannot 
be attributed to unfavourable climatic conditions and 
that it is certainly the result of a complex set of factors. 
These factors are the following: a) «subsidies from the 
budget to promote changes in the structure of crops, 
after major increases until 1966..., declined in 1969
4. The failure of agriculture in realizing its potential pro­
ductive capacity is discussed by John Campbell, in Modern 
Greece, in op. cit., p. 332 and c. Campbell also reports that for a 
number of years since the war the government has guaranteed 
a minimum price for wheat. Cf. also Association of Greek In­
dustrialists, «Employment in Low Productivity Sectors,» in 
op. cit., p. 74 and c. where the low productivity of agriculture 
and the structural problems in this sector are discussed.
5. Cf. John Pesmazoglu, «The Greek Economy,» in Greece 
under Military Rule, in op. cit., pp. 80-82.
6. The crops which dominate Greek agriculture are wheat, 
tobacco and olives. As for the main agricultural exports of the 
country these are tobacco, currants, sultanas, fruits and cotton.
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TABLE V: Economically Active Population by Region, and Main Sector as Percentage
1960
Regions Prim. Second. Tert. Prim.
of Total—for 1961 and 1971
1970
Second. Tert.
More Developed
Attica and Aegean Islands 20.2 31.4
W.C. Macedonia 60.0 18.5
Intermediate
Peloponnesos 69.2 13.0
Thessaly 68.0 13.8
Peripheral
Epirus 69.6 12.0
Thrace 77.0 10.4
Crete 70.0 11.0
48.4 12.0 37.0 51.0
21.5 44.1 26.1 29.8
17.8 63.0 15.6 21.4
18.2 60.2 17.3 22.5
18.4 61.0 16.9 22.1
12.6 70.1 12.0 17.9
19.0 63.6 15.4 21.0
Source: Center for Planning and Economic Research, 15 Year Plan, Census of 1961 and 1971.
and were reduced in 1970 to a level lower than that 
of 1966; b) the share of investment for agricultural 
development in total central government investment 
declined from 28% to 24%. Although expenditure for 
large-scale reclamation or irrigation projects con­
tinued to rise, there was a decline in essential supple­
mentary spending to induce the necessary shifts and 
adjustments in production; c) the cancellation of agri­
cultural debts in 1968 was not associated with any 
systematic policy designed to promote agricultural 
modernization and growth; borrowers who had settled 
their obligations before the announcement of debt 
cancellation did not benefit from it; d) the uncertainty 
with respect to the conditions under which a number 
of Greek agricultural products could be exported to 
European markets, after the suspension in 1967 of 
major parts of the Agreement of Association between 
Greece and the European Community. More generally 
the interruption of «harmonization» of agricultural 
policies with the community has been a serious setback 
to Greek agriculture... The traditional procedure 
of plot re-allotment and consolidation had long proved 
too slow and inadequate. Finally, the resumption in 
the last few years of mass emigration from the rural 
areas and the slowdown in agricultural production 
are becoming mutually determined processes, leading 
to agricultural stagnation. This is already pronounced 
in some of the main tobacco-producing areas in the 
north of Greece.»1
Regional Distribution of Agriculture
Table V shows that agriculture still remains the 
dominant activity of the peripheral regions of Greece. 
Furthermore, as is shown in Table VI, the peripheral 
regions are underrepresented in their share in total 
national population as well as in their share of gross 
domestic product. In 1971, the periphery had 18.5%
1. Cf. John Pesmazoglu, «Slow-down in Agricultuie»—«The
Greek Economy» in op. cit., pp. 80-82.
of the total national population and a share of only 
11.6 % in gross domestic product.
TABLE VI: Distribution of Regional Population and Regional 
Distribution of Gross Domestic Product as Percentage of Total, 
1961-1971
1961 1971
Regions Popul.
%
GDP
%
Popul.
%
GDP
%
More Developed Regions
Attica and Aegean Islands 33.60 49.60 40.00 54.30
W.C. Macedonia 16.00 16.48 16.50 17.00
intermediate Regions
Peloponnesos 17.45 12.24 15.00 10.00
Thessaly 11.12 7.92 10.00 7.10
Peripheral Regions
Epirus 5.77 3.44 4.90 2.80
Thrace 10.33 6.56 8.50 5.40
Crete 5.77 3.76 5.20 3.40
Source: Data calculated from Center for Planning and Economic 
Research, 15 Year Plan, Census of 1961 and 1971.
Another factor that operates to the detriment of 
the periphery is that the regional distribution of pro­
duction of some basic crops shows that the more 
developed and intermediate regions (Attica, Central 
Greece, Macedonia, Peloponnesos and Thessaly) are 
producers of some importance while the periphery 
(Epirus, The Islands and Thrace) have actually little 
to offer except some oranges, wheat and a little to­
bacco. 2
Furthermore, Campbell reports that «it is possible 
to identify an area extending from Attica north to 
Macedonia (i.e. the prosperous Athens-Salonica axis) 
as a zone of real demographic and productive in­
crease... In these plains, particularly, the mecha­
nization of agriculture has been possible and profit-
2. Cf. B. Ward, «The Regional Distribution of Economic 
Activity,» «Agriculture and mining,» p. 39, in op. cit.
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able. With deeper ploughing, weed control and greater 
use of fertilizers, yields have increased. In many 
villages of this more fertile area the cultivated area 
per head of the country population is greater than 
elsewhere; and fragmentation of farm holdings, al­
though only slightly less considerable than in other 
areas, is less crippling in the conditions of flat plain- 
land.»1 The above description by Campbell shows that 
the more developed and intermediate regions (Attica, 
Central Greece, Peloponnesos, Thessaly, Macedonia) 
are also more advanced and modernized in agricul­
tural production than the peripheral regions (Epirus, 
The Islands, Crete and Thrace) (see Map III).
The fact that the peripheral areas produce a small 
proportion of the nation’s agricultural product and 
furthermore have a low per capita productivity in 
agriculture (see Tables VII and Vili) is also a measure 
of the extent to which inhabitants of these regions are 
cut off from modern economic life.
TABLE VII: Agricultural and Non-agricultural Gross 
Domestic Product by Region — for 1961 and 1971
In Percentage of the total 
1961 Ϊ97Ϊ
Agricul- Non-agii- Agricul- Non- 
Regions turai cultuial turai agricult.
More Developed Regions
Attica and Aegean Islands 14 63 14 62
W.C. Macedonia 20 15 22 16
Intermediate Regions
Peloponnesos 24 8 21 8
Thessaly 15 5 16 5
Peripheral Regions
Epirus 6 2 6 2
Thrace 14 4 14 4
Crete 7 3 7 3
National Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Calculated from Centre for Planning and Economic Research, 
15 Year Plan, Census of 1961 and 1971.
The above Table shows the small contribution of 
the periphery in both the country’s agricultural and 
non-agricultural gross product. Furthermore, it is 
striking that there has been no relative progress 
whatsoever for the periphery during the 1961-1971 
period. This is despite the fact that the periphery has 
experienced a mass emigration of 383,000 people in 
the 1961-1971 period, i.e. 78% of total national net 
mirgation, as is shown in Table XIX (page 352).
Thus, the peripheral regions’ economy and em­
ployment are still mainly in agriculture. This agri­
culture remains traditional in character, with low
1. Cf. John Campbell, «The Greek Countryside,» in op. cit.,
p. 323.
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TABLE VIII: Per Capita Agricultural Gross Domestic Product
by Region for 1971
Regions
1971
Per Capita
Agricultural
GDP
(in drachmae)
More Developed Regions
Attica and Aegean Isl. 44,595
W.C. Macedonia 42,857
Intermediate Regions
Peloponnesos 30,117
Thessaly 36,842
Peripheral Regions
Epirus 26,667
Thrace 30,396
Crete 28,220
Source: Calculated from Centre for Planning and Economic Research 
15 Year Plan, Census of 1961 and 1971.
Note: The per capita agricultural GDP has been calculated by dividing 
each region’s agricultural GDP by the region’s number of econom­
ically active people in agriculture. The above per capita GDP also 
shows the regional productivity in agriculture.
productivity, while the structure of the Greek economy 
as a whole is shifting from the primary sector through 
the secondary to the tertiary stages cf development 
(see Tables II and III).
Both the secondary and tertiary sectors are heavily 
concentrated in the more developed regions (Attica 
and Macedonia) (see Tables V and VII). It, therefore, 
becomes evident that this trend does not benefit the 
periphery but rather benefits the more developed 
regions and especially Attica (the core region).
According to the neo-classical equilibrium theory 
and analysis of labour migration formulated by Mrs. 
Vera Lutz,2 outflow of under-employed or unemployed 
labour from agriculture should bring an automatic 
raising of land-labour ratios and productivity in agri­
culture as well as levelling of regional per capita in­
come. The theory assumes that labour migrates from 
low-income to high-income regions and capital flows 
from high-income to low income regions.
Mrs. Lutz applied this theory in her analysis of 
the dual economy of Italy in the 1950s, divided between 
a predominantly industrialized North and a predom­
inantly agricultural South. This was a situation very 
similar to the present dualistic division of Greece 
between the core and the periphery regions as we have 
already described them.
Mrs. Lutz argued that emigration from the South 
should be continued to the point at which «natural» 
factor proportions were secured. These proportions 
would be achieved through the «natural» growth of 
the market for industrial products through the joint
2. Cf. Vera Lutz, Italy—A Study in Economic Development, 
London, OUP, 1962.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 07/06/2020 15:13:06 |
regional development—core-periphery relations: the Greek case
TABLE IX: Gross Domestic Fixed Asset Formation 
Current prices, million drachmae
Gross fixed asset formation 
(including ships)
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969*
27,536 27,056 27,868 27,202 34,957 40,349 46,892 45,876 60,756 74,798
Gross fixed asset formation (excluding ships) 19,866 21,506 25,128 26,892 33,107 38,625 43,144 43,557 53,499 66,096
Building 8,823 9,377 11,116 12,279 14,934 16,666 19,063 17,841 25,200 30,292
Dwellings 5,730 6,158 7,468 8,099 10,011 11,893 13,288 12,092 16,911 20,948
Other building 3,093 3,219 3,648 4,180 4,923 4,773 5,775 5,749 8,289 9,344
Other construction and works 5,559 6,156 6,519 6,535 7,317 9,438 9,848 10,632 12,467 14,134
Transport equipment 1,415 1,688 2,288 2,264 2,971 3,136 5,005 4,590 4,066 6,401
Machinery and other equipment 4,069 4,285 5,205 5,814 7,885 9,385 9,228 10,494 11,769 15,269
Agriculture, animal breeding, fishing 3,490 3,696 3,481 3,847 4,331 4,808 4,830 5,541 6,451 6,952
Mining and quarrying 106 147 199 336 362 492 498 625 633 635
Manufacturing 2,039 2,588 3,419 3,509 4,660 5,778 5,813 5,461 6,828 7,512
Electricity, gas, etc 1,497 1 449 1,962 1,838 2,816 3,477 3,110 4,504 4,959 6,543
Transportation and communication2 3,782 4,233 4,761 4,902 6,344 6,893 9,061 9,055 9,889 13,197
Dwellings 5,730 6,158 7,468 8,099 10,011 11,893 13,288 12,092 16,911 20,948
Public administration 278 230 227 255 227 147 371 404 325 572
Other service industries 2,944 3,005 3,611 4,106 4,356 5,137 6,173 5,875 7,503 9,737
Private 13,297 13,709 16,665 18,713 23,825 27,949 31,456 30,060 38,485 47,416
Public 6,569 7,797 8,463 8.179 9,282 10,676 11,688 13,497 15,014 18,680
1. Provisional estimates.
2. Including a large share of construction expenditure.
Source: National Accounts of Greece, Ministry of Coordination and direct communication to the OECD.
OECD Economic Surveys, G r e e c e, February 1971, p. 65.
effects of 1) out-migration from the agricultural sector 
in the less developed region, which is supposed to 
raise land-labour ratios and thus output per head for 
the remaining working population in agriculture; 2) 
the maintenance of previous agricultural output levels 
with a smaller labour force will mean raised producti­
vity, and the generation of a surplus of food products 
over local consumption needs; 3) the export of this 
surplus to the more developed regions will result in 
net savings in agriculture which can be invested either 
in improvements to techniques of production through 
mechanization, or in industry within the region, or 
both; 4) investment of the agricultural savings surplus 
in industry will have two-fold virtuous effects for re­
gional agriculture through (a) increasing labour out­
flow from the sector through demand for more labour 
in regional industry, thereby further increasing agri­
cultural productivity, and (b) increasing the demand 
for food in the expanded industrial workforce, where 
out-migrants from agriculture no longer produce food 
for their own consumption; 5) increased agricultural 
productivity will create in turn a «natural» demand 
for industrial products. This newly created «natural» 
demand for industrial products will now offer new 
opportunities for industrial investment in the under­
developed South.
It follows from the above analysis that capital 
inflows from the developed North will start pouring 
into the southern region in order to act in such a way 
as to restore equilibrium into the system and eliminate
the existing dualism between the North and South. 
This inflow of capital is expected to meet the newly 
created demand for industrial products, i.e. the de­
mand generated by the sale of agricultural surplus 
made possible by emigration of excess labour and 
higher labour productivity in agriculture.
This theory has been authoritatively contested in 
the Italian case by Holland, Ackley and Spaventa, and 
Allen.1 In the case of Greece the so-called «natural» 
factor proportions have never been secured through 
emigration. There has been no higher labour produc­
tivity in agriculture; no development of agricultural 
exports in the peripheral regions. The only thing that 
has persisted is emigration. There has been no «nat­
ural» demand for industrial products in the peripher­
al regions, either. As for new opportunities for in­
dustrial investment there, we will show below what a 
little share the periphery has in industrial production. 
Thus, the above theory is also contradicted by all the 
evidence we have already presented for the Greek 
case.
1. Cf. Stuart Holland, «Regional Under-development in a 
Developed Economy: The Italian Case» inRegional Development 
in Theory and Italian Practice, in op. cit. Gardner Ackley and 
Luigi Spaventa, «Emigration and Industrialization in Southern 
Italy,» Banco Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, June 1962. 
Kevin Allen and M. C. Maclennan, «Regional Problems and 
Policies in Italy» in Regional Problems and Policies in Italy 
and France, London, G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970.
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Industry
Another weakness of the Greek economy is that 
although in the period 1965-1972 the country’s GDP 
doubled, per capita income increased and the country 
enjoyed and experienced a degree of affluence, its 
industrial sector is still characterized by small family 
businesses, high costs, old obsolete machinery (until 
recently protected by tariffs and severe import con­
trols which blocked competition from abroad). Table 
IX shows that very little private or public investment 
in capital formation and in industry is actually taking 
place.
A multiplicity of small family firms, as is shown 
in Table X, contribute a substantial part of the na­
tional production. Unwilling or unable to obtain long­
term credit to modernize their methods and reduce 
their costs, bound to a local circle of clients and pro­
tected from foreign competition, they are not equipped 
to sell their products abroad. In other words, industry 
is backward, inefficient and no scale economies can 
be achieved by them.1
TABLE X: Distribution of Manufacturing Establishments by 
Region and by Size for 1970
Regions 1-19 persons 20 and above
More Developed Regions
Attica and Aegean Islands 52,887 1,688
W. C. Macedonia 21,733 525
Intermediate Regions
Peloponnesos 15,558 231
Thessaly 10,791 139
Peripheral Regions
Epirus 5,089 32
Thrace 8,736 95
Crete 7,082 65
Total Greece 121,876 2,775
Source: Industrial Census of 1969 Centre for Planning and Economic
Research.
Table X shows that from the 124,651 industrial 
establishments in Greece only 2,775 (2.2%) are em­
ploying 20 persons and over and of these more than 
half (60.82%) are located in Athens and (18.91%) in 
W. Macedonia (Salonica). The periphery has a very 
small share (6.91%) of the larger establishments. It 
also becomes evident that the bulk of the industrial 
establishments (97.8%) are employing less than 20 
people and that almost one-fifth of them are located
1. Cf. George Coutsoumaris, The Morphology of Greek
Industry, Center of Economic Research, 1963, Athens, also
Howard S. Ellis, Industrial Capital in Greek Development, Cen­
ter of Economic Research, Athens, 1964 and B. Ward, «Indus­
try» in Greek Regional Development, in op. cit., pp. 44-52.
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in the periphery, where family firms and obsolete 
equipment are to be found.
The evidence we have from Gross Domestic Asset 
Formation for the period 1960 to 1972 shows the 
strong propensity to invest in construction (dwellings) 
and government investment in infrastructure, espe­
cially transport and communications.2 The investment 
in dwellings has mainly favoured Athens, as there is 
a high concentration on upper middle-class apartment 
buildings there. This is hardly a leading industry in 
the Perroux sense of «industrie motrice» or in the 
Hirschman sense of high-linkage industry. A sub­
stantial amount of this capital invested in Athens’ 
apartment houses is coming from the periphery where 
owners of large and medium land property invest 
whatever surplus they gain from agriculture into 
housing in Athens or Salonica. Here the basic prin­
ciple, formulated by Frank, is in full swing—that is 
the process by which the exploitation of the satellite 
(or peripheral) region by the metropolis (or core re­
gion) occurs by the expropriation of surplus, its ap­
propriation by the metropolis and its consequent 
unavailability to the satellite region.
On the other hand, the government’s investing in 
road construction has contributed to the development 
of the Athens-Salonica axis, which runs along the 
core region (Attica), the intermediate region of Thes­
saly and terminates at the more developed region of 
W. C. Macedonia.
The structure of gross domestic asset formation 
also shows that the induced effects formulated by 
Perroux are only partly relevant to the Greek case 
and economy. What we have in the Athens Growth 
Pole is mostly Myrdal’s «spread effect» induced by 
increased consumption and incomes and agglomer­
ation effects of complementary industries, which are 
mainly light and service industries. There is little 
creation of intermediate industry promoting vertical 
and horizontal linkages in the Perroux-Hirschman 
sense.3 Businessmen are not persuaded by the in­
crease in the natural growth rate of the economy to 
invest more in the production of goods. Harrod’s 
theory of «warranted» and «natural» growth rates is 
not fully relevant in the Greek case. Because of an 
inherent suspicion and dislike of Greek entrepreneurs 
in investing in capital goods, this is left to incoming 
foreign investment.4
2. See Table IX. Cf. also Greek National Statistics Yearbook, 
1973, p. 363, «Gross domestic asset formation for 1965-1972.»
3. The so-called «Industries motrices» of Perroux, or high- 
linkage industries of Hirschman.
4. John Campbell, «Economic dilemmas» in Modern Greece, 
pp. 319-320 says that «to create export industry and to expect an 
annual increment of 6 per cent to the GNP one must assume 
that there will be a decisive increase in private investment in 
industry and that much of this money will come from abroad.... 
and that fluctuations in the growth of private productive invest-
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Another structural weakness in Greek industry is 
that it is mainly dominated by traditional industries 
such as food and textile industries. This pattern of 
dominance by textile and food industries combined 
with a relatively small contribution to GDP by manu­
facturing, taken as awhole, is typical of the developing 
countries. In the case of textiles classification is some­
what arbitrary since textiles could be a highly dynamic 
sector in modern manufacturing as it allows the trans­
formation of natural fibre into compound natural 
and synthetic fibre products with modern production 
techniques.1 However, hereinbelow textiles will be 
classified under «traditional» manufacturing.
TABLE XI: Value Added by Selected Industrial Sectors as 
Percentage of Total for 1961 and 1971
Industrial Sectors 1961
%
1971
%
Traditional Manufacturing
Textiles 25.0 15.0
Food Industries 16.0 11.6
Non-metallic minerals 9.0 8.1
Modern Manufacturing
Chemicals 10.6 8.9
Basic Metals 4.2 7.7
Metal Products 4.5 5.1
Machinery 1.5 2.2
Electrical Supplies and Machinery 1.9 6.7
Transport Equipment 1.0 6.3
Paper and Printing 2.6 5.1
Rubber and Plastic 2.4 3.7
Source: Percentages calculated from Statistical Yearbook 
1 9 7 3, pp. 200-201, Industrial Census 1971. For 1961 value 
added weights see B. Ward, "Greece and Economic Develop­
ment,” in op. cit., p. 13.
Table XI shows that the dominant industry is in­
deed textiles, with over 25% of value added in total 
manufacturing in 1961 and 15% in 1971 and then 
comes the food industry with 16% of v.a. in total 
manufacturing in 1961 and 11.6% in 1971. The re­
maining sectors are contributing to the value added 
in total manufacturing but to a lesser extent.
As becomes evident from Table XI, there has been 
some improvement in the decade of 1960s in the coun­
try’s industrial structure and some shift towards the 
dynamic modern industries of metallurgy, electrical 
machinery, transport equipment, paper and printing, 
rubber and plastic. However, the leading industries 
remain those of food and textiles. As for the increased
ment depend almost entirely on the periodical enterprise of 
foreigners.» For a detailed account of foreign investment in 
Greece see Panayotis Roumeliotis, Investissement direct inter­
national et Economie nationale—Le cas de la Grèce, Centre de 
Planification et des Recherches Economiques, Athens, 1975.
1. In the Italian case, St. Holland classifies textiles under 
modem manufacturing, cf. his «Regional under-development, 
etc.» in op. cit.
share of the new dynamic industries in the country’s 
total manufacturing, this is mainly due to foreign 
investment (see Table XII).
TABLE XII: Foreign Invest ment in Greek Industry per Sector 
as Percentage of Total Investment for 1970
Industrial Sectors 19701 1961-68
Average2
Food and Beverage Industry 2 4.6
Textiles 2 5.6
Clothing and Footwear 4 16.7
Wood and furniture 10 23.6
Paper and products 4 17.9
Non-metallic minerals 14 12.6
Chemical products 68 82.6
Metal products-Metallurgy 8 64.4
Electrical products and machinery 7 12.6
Transport equipment 13 81.6
Other 8 —
1. 1970 percentages estimated by P. Roumeliotis based 011 non-published
data of the Bank of Greece and of the National Statistical Service of 
Greece.
2. Bulletin Economique pour l’Europe, vol. 23, No. 2, 972, cité par 
André Pia tier dans «Les sociétés multinationales dans l’économie médi­
terranéenne», Mondes en Développement, 2, Paris, 1973, 
P. 122.
Note: The discrepancies between the two percentages can be attributed to 
the fact that the statistics of the European Economic Commission 
reflect investment intentions (ex ante) and not realised investment 
(ex post). See Roumeliotis in op. cit. pp. 59-61.
Regional Distribution of Industry
As far as regional distribution of industry is con­
cerned Tables XIII and XIV, calculated from the In­
dustrial Census data of 1969 on employment and 
value added by main region and industrial sub-sector, 
show that the Periphery has a very small proportion 
of the country’s industrial employment and its share 
has actually declined during the period 1963-1969. 
Table XIII also shows that regional industrial labour 
force is mainly employed in traditional manufacturing 
(10.9% of the national total), in mining (11.1%), util­
ities (9.6%) and to a lesser extent (5.6%) in modern 
manufacturing.
Table XIV illustrates even more dramatically the 
négligeable share that the periphery has in national 
value-added. Its share of n.v.a. in traditional manu­
facturing is only 3.6% and 0.60% in modern manu­
facturing. Regional value-added in total manufac­
turing is 2.13% for the year 1971.
Unfortunately, there are no regional statistics 
available for value-added in industry for 1961. How­
ever, judging from Table XIII, it becomes evident that 
there has been ro progress in the periphery’s share 
in national industrial employment or value-added. 
A regression has rather taken place.
On the other hand, the evidence we have from the 
Industrial Census of 1969 indicates that Athens has
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the highest concentration of those industries consid­
ered by Kuklinski as «key» sectors* 1 for simulta­
neously raising both regional employment and income.
TABLE XIII: Industrial Employment—Periphery as Percentage 
of National Total
1963 1969
Traditional Manufacturing 12.0 10.9
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 21.0 17.3
Clothing 8.5 6.4
Wood and Furniture 15.0 15.0
Non-metallic minerals 11.4 12.0
Textiles 4.3 4.0
Modern Manufacturing 5.7 5.6
Paper and Printing 3.5 2.2
Chemicals, Rubber, Petroleum Prod. 1.4 3.1
Basic Metallurgy and Metal Prod. 
Engineering (machinery and transport
9.7 9,6
equipment) 6.0 6.0
Miscellaneous 7.7 7.3
Total Manufacturing 8.8 8.2
Mining 15.0 11.1
Power, Electricity and Gas 9:9 9.6
Total Industry 11.2 9.6
Source: Industrial Census 1969 made by Ministry of Coordination Data 
communicated directly by Center for Planning and Economic 
Research.
TABLE XTV: Industrial Value-added: Periphery as Percentage 
of National Total
1971
Traditional Manufacturing 3.60
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 8.00
Clothing, Skins 1.40
Woodwork and Furniture 3.80
Non-metallic mineral products 3.40
Textiles 1.30
Modem Manufacturing 0.66
Paper and Printing 0.05
Rubber-Chemicals-Petroleum Products 2.40
Metallurgy - Metal Products 0.04
Engineering (machinery - transport) 0.80
Miscellaneous —
Total Manufacturing 2.13
Source: Industrial Census 1969 by Ministry of Coordination. Data com­
municated directly by Centre for Planning and Economic Re­
search.
As shown in Map VI, Athens and Central Greece 
have a very high concentration of the «key» sectors
1. Kuklinski has identified engineering and chemical prod­
ucts in his ECE study of industrial location as those industrial
sectors showing the highest rates of growth of both product 
and employment and therefore «key» sectors for simultaneously 
raising both regional employment and income. Cf. A. Kuklinski, 
Criteria for the Location of Industrial Plant Economic Commis­
sion for Europe, 1966. Cf. also St. Holland, «Regional Under­
development in a Developed Economy: The Italian Case» in 
op. cit.
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of engineering and chemical products, both of them 
showing the highest rates of growth of both product 
and employment. Salonica comes second in its share 
of those two «key» sectors. The periphery is entirely 
under-represented in them. The case of Salonica 
becoming a counter-pole to Athens because of the 
gradual concentration there of dynamic «key» indus­
trial sectors has not been studied yet and requires 
further research.
Furthermore, the evidence we have shows that 
most of the recent years’ increase in industrial pro­
duction and exports for the period 1961-1971 was 
associated with modern manufacturing. Pesmazoglu 
maintains that «about one-third of the increase in 
industrial production during the 1961-1971 period 
and about three-quarters of the rise in industrial 
exports resulted from four leading industries: che­
micals, basic metallurgical, transport equipment 
(shipyards) and petroleum products.» We have seen 
above what a négligeable role the periphery plays in 
these leading dynamic industries and how these are 
concentrated mainly in the core region of Attica/ 
Central Greece, second in Peloponnesos (Patras) and 
finally in Macedonia (Salonica) region. Pesmazoglu 
also reports that «the increased activity in the leading 
industries is almost exclusively associated with ten 
firms.»2 These firms are all established either in the 
Region of Athens /Central Greece, or in Salonica and 
Patras and are in their great majority multinational 
companies. None of them is located in the peripheral 
regions.
Holland3 in his study of the Italian dualism main­
tains that «this disparate situation, with different 
types of firm concentrated in and serving effectively 
different types of regional market, provides a further 
dimension to the much advertised problem of inter­
regional dualism,» and that «when different types of 
firm are located in different regions the oligopolistic 
competition process within sectors will reinforce the 
interregional dualism problem.» He employs the 
inter-firm distinction formulated recently by Averitt4 
between «centre» and «periphery» systems in the US 
economy. According to Averitt the «'centre’ system 
is composed of firms which are large in size and in­
fluence, benefiting from management scale economies. 
...The 'periphery’ system is composed of relatively
2. Cf. John Pesmazoglu, «Slow-down in Industrial Invest­
ment» in op. cit., pp. 82-83. According to a classification of the 
200 leading companies in Greece, made by the Federation of 
Greek Industrialists, on the basis of the amount of their export 
activities, it appears that eight out of the first twelve leading 
companies are foreign or are financed from abroad. Cf. Deltion 
of Fed. of Greek Industrialists, No. 290.
3. Cf. St. Holland, Regional Development in Theory and 
Italian Practice, in op. cit., pp. 144-155.
4. Cf. Robert T. Averitt, The Dual Economy: The Dynamics 
of American Industry Structure, 1968, p. 108.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 07/06/2020 15:13:06 |
regional development—core-periphery relations: the Greek case
MAP VI. Regional Distribution and Structure of Industry
Location of the largest 100 industrial units and their branches on the basis of employment figures (maximum employment : 6,614
persons, minimum : 312)
Miscellaneous · O Textiles, Paper, Non-Metallic Minerals
1 5
Scale : 1: 4.000.000.1970 - Center for Planning and Economic Research
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small firms, which are usually dominated by a single 
individual or family. Its sales are realized in relatively 
restricted markets; its profits and retained earnings 
are commonly below those of firms in the centre sys­
tem, and its long-term borrowing is difficult. Pro­
duction techniques and marketing are rarely as up to 
date in the periphery system as in the centre system. 
The firms concerned are often, though not always, 
'technological followers’. Centre firms are in a po­
sition to employ research, innovation and advertising, 
to allocate resources to themselves and the industries 
under their control. Unions in centre firms are alle­
ged to aid them through putting pressure on key 
industry competitors to pay uniform wage rates 
which they can less easily afford.»
Holland concludes that «the result of such ten­
dencies if unchecked by government policies may be 
a situation in which interregional dualism in the sense 
of effectively separate regional economies with differ­
ent growth rates will be matched and reinforced by 
an intra-sectoral dualism, in which the different re­
gional markets are composed of firms which are 
effectively different in structure, actual growth and 
growth potential,» and that «this combination of 
factors operating within and between firms will limit 
the effectiveness of government policy to stimulate 
growth in the peripheral areas through development 
incentives such as investment loans and grants, com­
pany and personal tax concessions, regional employ­
ment premiums and similar indirect measures de­
signed to promote investment and expansion in the 
less developed peripheral regions.»
In the case of Greece it becomes evident that the 
regional distribution of manufacturing firms accord­
ing to size (see Table X) interacts with the regional 
distribution of modern manufacturing (see Map VI) 
and that the resulting intra-sectoral dualism tends to 
reinforce the already existing interregional dualism.
Services
Here again the predominance of the core region 
Attica in respect to the periphery is evident. Table XV 
shows the disproportionate share of Athens in the 
service sector. This imbalance in the share of services 
can be easily inferred from the following percentage 
shares that Athens has in the total employment of 
the corresponding activities.
If we also consider the concentration of all gov­
ernment services in Athens the share of services for 
Athens will certainly be larger. If now we consider the 
share that the tertiary sector has in the country’s 
GDP (48.69%), as well as the négligeable share of the 
periphery in that sector—some of the peripheral 
areas might have a somewhat large share in service 
employment but this is mostly due to low-productive
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TABLE XV
Athens share in Total
Activities Employment - 1971
(in percentage of total)
Utilities 51%
Transportation 60%
Trade 41.6%
Gross 56.3%
Retail 35.0%
Banking, Insurance, etc. 64%
Services (other than Government) 44%
Source: George Chiotis, “Regional Development Policy in Greece” in 
Tijdschrift voor econ. en soc. geografie, 
Maar t/April 1972.
personal services, like tourist services and small 
retail trade—we see how the process of the Myrdal 
«spread effect» works to the benefit of the core region 
and to the detriment of the periphery.
Regional Income
There are many economic indices available which 
point to the divergent regional development of the 
country. The most common one in economic literature 
is the regional income per head, which serves as an 
indicator of regional economic performance. Table 
XVI shows that Income per Head in the Periphery in 
1961 was between 40 and 44 percent of the level of the 
core region Attica. In 1971, despite regional incentives 
for decentralization offered by the government, we 
still see that it has only risen between 42 and 47 percent 
of the level of the core region.
TABLE XVI: Income per Head in Greece as Percentage of 
Attica Region
More Developed Intermediate Periphery
Regions Regions
Attica/ W.C. Pelo- Thes- E. Mace-E- Greece
Aegean Mace- ponne- saly Crete donia/ pi- 
lslands donia sos Thrace rus
1961 100 69 47 48 44 43 40 56
1971 100 76 49 52 47 47 42 59
Source: Centre for Planning and Economic Research— 15 Year Plan.
However, regional income per head is a rather 
misleading index and does not reveal the real differ­
ence in regional performance and prosperity. As 
Maph VII shows the disparity between percentage 
purchasing power of regions on country total for 1963 
Was enormous. It becomes evident from Map VII that 
even though regional product per head in the periph­
eral regions may be 40 or even 47 percent of the level 
of Attica region, the actual disparity in purchasing 
power may be ten times greater.
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MAP. VII. National Network of Urban Centers 
• g,. Percentage Purchasing Power of Regions on Country Total : Percentage 
tyoJ Population of Region x Indice of Purchasing Power per capita in the Region
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Here the argument of Frank that the core region 
expropriates the surplus created in the peripheral 
regions and consumes or invests it for its own benefit 
becomes dramatic. There is no data available for 
regional percentage purchasing power for 1971, but 
judging from Table XYI it becomes evident that the 
picture has not altered much. Furthermore, consid­
ering the multiplier effects1 that income, produced 
in the periphery and spent in Athens region either on 
industrial investment or on consumption goods, can 
have on the core region’s income, it becomes clear 
that Athens absorbs most of the country’s surplus in 
one way or another.
The available data on total family income for the 
fiscal years 1963-1972, given by the Greek National 
Statistical Service, is broken down only for the Greater 
Athens area and for the Rest of Greece. In 1963 the 
declared family income for the Rest of Greece was 
half (51.6%) of the level of the Greater Athens region. 
For 1973, it rose to two-thirds 164.89%) of the level 
of Greater Athens region.2 But this break-down of 
Greece’s regions into Athens and the Rest of Greece 
is misleading because the inclusion of the more devel­
oped region of Salonica and of the intermediate re­
gions of Peloponnesos and Thessaly into the Rest 
of Greece lessens the income disparity between Attica 
(the core region) and the peripheral regions.
There are other indices besides declared family 
income that give a picture of real income by region. 
Table XYII shows some characteristic indices of 
regional inequalities in living standards between 
Greater Athens region (the core region) and the 
peripheral regions of Thrace, Epirus, Ionian Islands.
1. Similar to the process of Myrdal’s «spread effects.»
2. Cf. «Total family income declared, by source of origin. 
Total Greece, Greater Athens and Rest of Greece, 1963-1972,» 
in Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1973, p. 332.
TABLE XVII: Characteristic Indices of Regional Inequalities 
in Living Standards
Indicator Greece Greater Thrace Epi- Ionian
Athens rus Islands
1. Per capita electric power
consumption (1995):
a. Total (kwh) 438 1,024 62 80 113
b. For domestic use (kwh) 128 387 18 28 42
2. Private cars (1965) per
10,000 inhabitants 113 327 21 18 36
3. Bath or shower (1961)
(percent of total house­
holds) 10 30 2 2 6
4. Drinking water supply
(1961) (percent of total 
households) 27 78 21 18 20
5. Inhabitants per: 
a. Doctor (1965) 708 307 1,835 1,740 1,377
b. Dentist (1965) 2,453 1,031 6,422 5,497 6,745
c. Hospital bed (1965) 169 79 505 466 166
6. Illiterates (1961) (per­
cent of population) 17 10 30 22 25
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, National Sta- 
tistical Service of Greece. GeorgeChiotis, «Regional Develop­
ment Policy in Greece» in Tijdschrift voor econ. 
n soc. geografie - Maart /April 1972.
Did Regional Decentralization Incentives Benefit the 
Periphery?
As shown in Table XVIII, regional incentives for 
the period 1960-1970 did not greatly succeed in 
reducing the share of agriculture in total regional 
employment in the periphery. Some peripheral re­
gions, namely Thrace, still has 70% of its labour force 
engaged in agriculture. It also becomes evident from 
Table XVIII that the total net outflow of labour from 
agriculture, approaching 209,000 people, was not 
absorbed by industry or services (non-agricultural 
employment)witbin the donor region. On the contrary,
TABLE XVIII: Employment in the Periphery by Main Sector 1960-1970 (In thousands)
Peripheral Regions Sector 1960 % Change
60-70
1970 %
Epirus Agriculture 151 69.6 — 46 105 61.0
Industry 26 12.0 3 29 16.9
Services 40 18.4 — 2 38 22.1
Total Epirus 217 100.0 — 45 172 100.0
E. Macedonia and Thrace Agriculture 355 77.0 —128 227 70.1
Industry 48 10.4 — 9 39 12.0
Services 58 12.6 0 58 17.9
Total E. Macedonia and Thrace 461 100.0 —137 324 100.0
Crete Agriculture 159 70.0 — 35 124 63.6
Industry 25 11.0 5 30 15.4
Services 44 19.0 — 3 41 21.0
Total Crete 228 100.0 — 27 195 100.0
Source: Data calculated from 15 Year Plan. Center for Planning and Economic Research.
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FIGURE 1: Cumulative Regional Divergence Process 
NORTH ITALY SOUTH
Factor earnings equal to South: 
some unemployment and /or underemployment
Autonomous increase in rate of investment: 
approach to full employment ceiling
Ψ
Multiplier effect: rise in factor earnings over South
1
Rise in warranted rate of growth (accelerator effect) 
in reaction to higher MEC schedule than previously and 
availability of labour from South 
PLUS
Rise in natural rate of growth from capital and labour 
imports from South, raising full-employment ceiling
___________________i__________________
Increase in rate of investment from higher 'domestic’ 
savings 
PLUS
additional increase from savings imported from South
I
Increased productivity from higher capital-labour ratio 
(both from increase in domestic savings and from import 
of proportionately more capital than labour from South) 
PLUS
greater technical progress than South from more capital 
intensive investment
I
Increased multiplier effect and further rise in factor 
earnings, inducing further factor inflow from South
Further rise in warranted and natural rates of growth,etc.
Factor earnings equal to North: 
substantial unemployment and underemployment
________________Φ________________
Induced investment at same rate as previously
Multiplier effect: fall in factor earnings below North 
Migration of factors of production to North, but pro­
portionately more capital than labour (granted greater 
'spatial elasticity’)
Decline in both warranted and natural growth rates 
(fall off in level of investible funds, lowering both po­
tential investment and capital-labour ratio)
I
First decline in intraregional rate of investment from 
lowered domestic savings
______________ i______________
Decreased productivity from lowered capital-labour 
ratio; either reduction of rate of technical progress or 
possibly negative technical progress from more labour 
intensive investment
I
Decreased multiplier effect and possible absolute decline 
in factor earnings: intensified factor outflow to North
Further fall in warranted and natural rates of growth, etc.
Source: Stuart Holland, R e g i ο n a 1 Development in Theory and Italian P r a c t ic e,in op. cit., Figure 6.
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there was a decrease in the periphery’s industrial 
employment of 1,000 people and a further decrease 
in the service employment of 5,000 people. The 209,000 
people leaving primary employment in the periphery 
were not absorbed in non-agricultural employment 
within their regions. As is shown below they emigrated 
to Athens, Salonica or Germany.
Table XIX shows that while in the period 1960- 
1970 there was a total increase of 282,000 in non-agri­
cultural employment in the rest of the country, the 
periphery experienced a decrease of 6,000 people in 
nonagricultural employment. It thus becomes evident 
that the peripheral regions did not contribute at all 
in the national increase of non-agricultural employ­
ment over this period.
TABLE XIX: Increase in Employment and Migration from
More developed
and Intermedi­
ate regions
Periphery Greece
Increase in non-agricul­
tural employment 282 —6 276
Interregional emigration 328 230
Interregional immigration 558 — 558International emigration 345 153 498
Net emigration 115 383 498
Source: Data calculated on the basis of the 15 Year Plan. Center for 
Planning and Economic Research. Migration figures communi­
cated directly by the Center.
Furthermore, Table XIX shows that net emigration 
from the periphery totalled 383,000 people, which 
were more than double the natural increase of the 
region, which amounted to 159,000 people for the 
same peiiod. It becomes evident that the periphery 
contributed most to the net emigration of the country, 
without at the same time succeeding in raising its 
productivity, its income and its share in the country’s 
non-agricultural employment and product.
Table VII (page 342) shows the small contribution 
and the no relative progress of the periphery both in 
the country’s agiicultural gross product as well as 
non-agricultural gross product, for the period 1961- 
1971.
It could be argued that this outflow of agricultural 
labour from the periphery to the core region has 
contributed to the growth of Athens by raising its full 
employment ceiling. Stated in terms of Holland’s 
regional application of Keynes-Harrod growth and 
trade cycle models,1 the «natural rate of growth» in 
Athens was raised by labour inflow from the periphery,
1. Cf. St. Holland, «Interregional Factor Migration, and
Keynesian Growth and Trade Cycle Models» in Regional De­
velopment, etc., in op. cit., pp. 47-62.
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which in turn has affected the «warranted rate of 
growth» anticipated by Athenian businessmen and 
permitted an upwards virtuous spiral in which higher 
productivity allowed both high profits and a high rate 
of saving and investment. The above outlined process 
is very similar to the one outlined by Holland (see 
Figure I), in which he shows the divergence process 
between the more developed Italian North and the less 
developed South. In the case of Greece the interregion­
al inter-reaction was between the core region 
(Athens) and the periphery. As for the autonomous 
increase in the rate of investment, this was the same 
for both countries, i.e. it was due to the injection of 
the Marshall Aid after the second world war.
The divergence process, outlined in Figure I, shows 
what would have happened in theory and was true up 
to the late 1960s. But the Greek economy is so in­
efficient structurally that the expansion of the core’s 
economy was insufficient to absorb the periphery’s 
unemployed workers, who finally decided to emi­
grate abroad (mostly to Germany).2
The extent of international emigration was such 
that serious shortages developed by 1970. In the 
summer of 1971, the Federation of Greek Textile 
Manufacturers officially requested the government 
to lift the ban on immigration from Asia and Africa 
sc that they could employ Pakistani workers in Greek 
textile plants.3 According to a report by the Fede­
ration of Greek Industrialists,4 the number of foreign 
workers in Greece was estimated at the beginning of 
1973 to be 25,000 to 30,000, i.e. the 0.8% of the Greek 
labour force. It was also estimated that there were 
30,000 foreign seamen working on Greek ships. Ac­
cording to the same report, at the beginning of 1973 
the Federation of Greek Industrialists informed the 
government that they were ready to absorb 10,000 
more foreign workers if the supply of Greek workers 
were not sufficient. This is one of the anomalies that 
massive international emigration brought about.
While a high rate of savings and investment could 
allow an expansion of productivity in modern in­
dustry,5 we have demonstrated above how little Greek 
investment was realized in manufacturing.
2. Holland later in his text also relaxes the assumption that 
his model can explain regional inter-reaction after the early 
1960s in Italy and maintains that «it was partly the 'opening to 
the Left’ of Italian politics in the early 1960’s as well as the ap­
proach of the national economy to nominally frictional unem­
ployment levels which permitted increased union pressure,... 
wage increases in excess of productivity increases,... pro­
moting the first major national balance of payments deficit since 
the war.»Cf. Holland, op. cit., pp. 60-61.
3. Cf. George Yannopoulos, «Workers and Peasant?» in 
Greece under Military Rule, in op. cit., p. 121.
4. Cf. Federation of Greek Industrialists, «Labour Market 
and Wage Structure in Greek Industry,» Employment of 
Foreign Workers, in op. cit., pp. 68-73.
5. Holland in his argument of sustained growth in the more
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The second anomaly brought about by massive 
emigration was that part of the impressive growth of 
Athens’ income and economic performance was not 
based on sound productive investment but was highly 
dependent on emigrants’ remittances and tourists’ 
receipts. In 1972 almost one fourth of the Current 
Transactions Account of the country’s Balance of 
Payments was made up by emigrants’ remittances. 
A sixth of the same account was made up by foreign 
travel receipts (see Table XX).
Most of this inflow of foreign currency was again 
spent or invested in Athens into the construction of 
dwellings, rather than modern industry, as well as in 
the consumption of goods and services. Here we also 
have the case of expropriation of surplus created in 
Germany and spent in luxury goods in Greece and 
particularly in the core region Athens.
This is in a few words how for 10 years Greece’s 
economic boom and miracle came about based and 
dependent on invisible receipts which are highly sen­
sitive, unreliable and subject to major international 
fluctuations. This is also the main reason why all 
Greek governments never bothered to stop emi­
gration. It was helping to bridge the gap into their Bal­
ance of Payments Account.
Summarizing, we have demonstrated above that 
Greece’s economy suffers from two main structural 
weaknesses. First, a traditional non-modernized, low 
productive agricultural sector. Second, in the indus­
trial sector we have the predominance of traditional 
manufacturing as well as the existence of many small 
non-competitive tariff protected family firms, pro­
ducing for a limited market with obsolete machinery 
and high costs. Both of these weaknesses in agri­
culture and industry are to be found mainly in the 
peripheral regions of the country where an interre­
gional dualism is matched and reinforced by an in- 
tra-sectoral dualism.
We have also demonstrated that Greece’s recent 
economic boom was mainly based on invisible receipts
developed regions maintains that «this would be particularly 
likely to the extent that the growth rate of the more developed 
region during the period of initial gain of portfolio capital from 
the less developed regions was sufficient to permit those entirely 
new plants which can embody major productivity and innovation 
gains» and that «it would be likely to be sustained to the extent 
that a fast rate of growth of demand permitted a fast rate of 
amortization of even the new innovating investment, with second 
round investment in further major innovations, with higher 
productivity gains.» Cf. his Regional Development, etc., in op. 
cit., p. 59.
(i.e. emigrants’ remittances and tourism), which stim­
ulated consumption and construction rather than 
modern industry in the Greater Athens area. At the 
same time the periphery lost human and capital re­
sources to the core and abroad without being able to 
improve its position and without sharing in the so- 
called «national economic affluence.»
summary and conclusions
An attempt was made in this paper to demonstrate 
the process by which regional polarization and devel­
opment occur in industrializing countries. The case 
of Greece was presented and analyzed as an example 
of highly polarized regional development.
In Greece the polarization process actually started 
in the 1830s with the emergence of the new modern 
Greek nation-state. It was the social change and «in­
stitutional» innovations injected into the system that 
transformed the «traditional» socio-economic spatial 
structure of the country by attracting innovative per­
sonalities; the country’s élites; and consequently all 
economic activities; science; education; and culture 
into the enclave of accelerated change, the new capital 
Athens, which later became the core region while the 
rest of the country was left in a backwater. The core 
region started organizing the periphery into depen­
dency by the gradual neutralization and co-option of 
the periphery’s élites; by the creation of an adaptive 
system characterized by authority-dependency rela­
tions; and by the penetration and transformation of 
the periphery’s social values and institutions in the 
direction of greater acceptance and conformity with 
its own value system.
The polarization process that started in the 1830s 
was later reinforced by the «technical» and «econom­
ic» innovations introduced in the 1950s into the 
system. The industrialization of the country was once 
again focused around the core region, Athens. But 
due to fundamental structural weaknesses in the 
country’s economy, the so-called economic «miracle» 
of the core region was not based on modern dynamic 
industry and productive investment but rather on the 
«spread effects» of invisible receipts which in turn 
stimulated consumption and construction in the core 
region. At the same time the periphery sank deeper 
and deeper in backwater and stagnation and never 
participated in the core region’s «miracle.»
It is believed that the above process of regional 
polarization and development is characteristic of most 
industrializing countries where core-periphery rela­
tions are still predominant influences.
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TABLE XX: Balance of Payments—Basic Global Data: 1969-1972 
(Based on foreign exchange statistics - Million U.S. dollars)
1969 1970 1971 1972
Category Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit
Current transactions
Goods and services 1,050.2 1,677.5 1,225.1 1,974.5 1,455.1 2,264.9 1,870.9 2,844.1
1. Goods 530.3 1,433.6 612.2 1,704.6 624.8 1,945.2 835.5 2,441.3
2. Foreign travel 149.5 47.9 193.6 55.3 305.3 73.7 392.7 95.8
3. Transportation 214.0 30.2 276.9 42.0 369.2 62.8 433.5 77.7
4. Insurance premiums 1.8 9.7 3.5 9.7 3.9 8.5 3.2 11.4
5. Investment income 9.8 43.7 11.5 60.4 9.1 76.7 26.4 86.9
6. Government 44.1 67.1 40.9 45.3 41.0 34.7 48.0 47.2
7. Miscellaneous 70.7 45.3 86.5 57.2 101.8 63.3 131.6 83.8
Net balance of goods and services — 627.3 — 749.4 — 809.8 — 973.2
Donations 279.4 1.4 346.4 1.5 470.8 1.9 572.1 3.5
8. Private (Emigrant remit.) 277.3 1.4 344.6 1.5 469.6 1.9 571.4 3.5
9. Official 2.1 — 1.8 — 1.2 — 0.7 —9.1 Reparations, restitutions 1.8 — 1.4 — 0.9 — 0.4 —9.2 Economic and technical 0.3 — 0.4 - 0.3 - 0.3 —assistance
Net donations 278.0 - 344.9 - 468.9 — 568.6 —Net balance (1 through 9) — 349.3 — 404.5 — 340.9 — 404.6
Movement of capital and monetary 328.2 ___ 373.1 __ _ 334.7 ___ 401.4 ___
gold (net)
10. Private 270.7 48.5 365.4 47.6 382.7 58.4 645.1 76.2
10.1 Long-term capital 243.6 48.5 333.6 47.6 330.0 58.4 578.4 75.9
Capital under L. D. 2687 /53 25.8 21.7 50.0 24.4 42.4 24.1 55.8 25.8
Suppliers’ credits 28.6 — 51.2 — 35.5 — 131.5 —
Other loans by private corp. 71.8 11.5 114.9 7.2 74.8 12.0 68.7 23.6
Other loans by public corp. 29.7 7.7 13.7 7.8 28.3 11.5 122.4 16.7
Other private capital 87.7 7.6 103.8 8.2 149.0 10.8 200.0 9.8
10.2 Short-term capital 27.1 — 31.8 — 52.7 — 66.7 0.3
Suppliers’ credits 26.8 — 31.4 — 51.2 — 66.7 —
Private barter 0.3 — 0.4 — 1.5 — — 0.3
11. Central Government (Long-term) 54.9 34.3 30.4 34.5 17.9 43.4 17.8 43.1
Loans repayable in local currency 0.9 4.3 — 3.8 — 3.3 — 2.7
Loans repayable in foreign exchange 54.0 30.0 30.4 30.7 17.9 40.1 17.8 40.4
12. Central Monetary Institution 56.2 16.2 30.6 27.8 168.9 262.4 261.1 606.8
Participation in intern, organ. — — — 10.6 ---- - — — —
Loans and credits 46.3 5.0 — 10.0 60.0 15.0 195.0 4.2
Other — — 14.2 0.3 57.5 36.4 41.4 61.5
Payments and clearing agreement — 6.2 — 6.9 33.1 — 24.7 —
Official foreign exchange reserves — 5.0 3.1 — — 211.0 — 463.5
Monetary gold 9.9 — 13.3 — 18.3 — — 37.6
13. Other Monetary Institutions 64.4 19.0 105.0 43.4 225.8 96.4 361.8 158.3
Loans and credits 11.7 2.3 18.7 2.9 45.2 6.4 64.1 6.6
Deposits under L.D. 2687/53 22.0 8.7 8.9 6.7 12.6 7.0 3.6 9.3
Other deposits 30.7 8.0 77.4 33.8 168.0 83.0 294.1 142.4
Creation of official reserves
14. Non monetary gold — — — ___ _ _ 23.6 —15. Allocation of SDRs — — 16.8 — 10.3 — — 7.1
Errors and omissions 21.1 — 9.6 — — 4.1 — 13.3
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Greece, Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1973, p. 365.
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